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INTRODUCTION 
Many have pointed to the fact that the spectacular economic 
growth in China has come at a high price, including serious natural 
resource damage. Increasing literature is available now, both in and 
outside of China, on the available regulatory instruments that China is 
increasingly using to prevent natural resource damage. An issue 
which has received less attention is the ex post compensation for 
natural resource damage, especially when damage is only caused to 
natural resources and no individual damage—be it property loss or 
individual injury—is involved. 
Both Europe and the United States have been confronted with 
spectacular cases of marine oil pollution. The Amoco Cadiz (1978), 
Erika (1999), and Prestige (2002) are well-known incidents that will 
last in the memory of many Europeans. The same is undoubtedly true 
with the Exxon Valdez (1989) in the United States, which gave rise to 
the promulgation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.1 So far, with the 
exception of a few “minor” incidents, China has been spared from 
similar catastrophes. However, China is increasingly becoming a 
major oil-importing nation and has a very long coastline that could 
potentially be exposed to marine pollution. This raises the question, 
how can a rapidly developing economy like China, with its huge oil 
demand, deal with the restoration of the environment after an oil spill 
and adequately compensate the victims? 
The aim of this Article is to address the question of whether China 
would be able to compensate future victims and restore the 
environment in the event of a marine oil spill. Indeed, the mere fact 
that there would be no individual victim does not mean that there 
would be no damage—this can only lead to a different claimant than 
in the case where an individual victim suffers a loss. 
 
1 See, e.g., Oil Pollution Act Overview, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1 
/content/lawsregs/opaover.htm (last modified Nov. 1, 2013). 
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In China, general environmental liability rules have been 
established under the General Principles of Civil Law, the 
Environmental Protection Act, and the newly adopted Tort Liability 
Law of 2009. However, these general rules make no explicit reference 
to natural resource damage. Many hurdles exist with respect to locus 
standi, causation, and the assessment of natural resource damage. The 
only domain in which compensation seems to work, not only on paper 
but also in practice, is the domain of marine oil pollution where 
international conventions have played an important role. In this 
research, we use marine oil pollution to show how natural resource 
damage claims can be compensated in China. Not only liability rules 
are discussed; this research also tries to find out how a financial 
security system can contribute to better prevention and compensation. 
The insurance products, especially the coverage provided by 
protection and indemnity clubs (P&I Clubs) and environmental 
compensation funds, are also addressed. We realize that marine oil 
pollution is still quite a broad concept, involving pollution from 
vessels, pipelines, and offshore facilities. This research will focus on 
vessel-induced pollution. Pollution resulting from pipelines and 
offshore facilities will not be not addressed. 
To further understand the system in China and in order to provide a 
comparative perspective, the international compensation system for 
oil pollution and the compensation regime established under the Oil 
Pollution Act in the United States are discussed. It is interesting to 
focus on the international regime and the U.S. Oil Pollution Act since 
they have been created largely as a reaction to major oil pollution 
incidents. To a limited extent, the 1992 Civil Liability Convention 
(CLC of 1992) and the 1992 Fund Convention extend the 
compensation system to natural resource damage. A more 
comprehensive compensation regime is established in the United 
States. China is a member of the CLC of 1992. China’s domestic 
legislation also allows public authorities to file a claim for a portion 
of natural resource damage. A comparison between the international, 
U.S., and Chinese systems will show to what extent natural resource 
damage caused by marine oil pollution is compensable in those 
different systems. It will equally show how different combinations of 
liability rules and compensation instruments (insurance, risk sharing 
pools, and environmental funds) can be used to achieve the goals of 
prevention and compensation for natural resource damage. 
This Article is set up as follows: First, a general introduction will 
discuss the compensation for natural resource damage in China, using 
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marine oil pollution as an example. Second, we will focus on liability 
rules and compensation instruments applicable to marine oil pollution 
under the international regime and in the United States. Third, we will 
focus on the compensation system for natural resource damage in 
China. Fourth, we will compare the liability rules and compensation 
scheme in all three systems. Finally, we will end with several 
observations. 
I 
COMPENSATION FOR NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE IN CHINA: 
GENERAL OVERVIEW 
A. Basis of Liability 
Traditionally, both civil law and environmental statutes provide 
remedies for environmental damage in China. Environmental liability 
rules are found both in the General Principles of Civil Law of 1986 
(GPCL)2 and in the Environmental Protection Act of 1989 (EPA).3 
However, there are some differences between the provisions in these 
two acts. 
Article 124 of the GPCL stipulates that “[a]ny person who pollutes 
the environment and causes damage to others in violation of State 
provisions for environmental protection and the prevention of 
pollution shall bear civil liability in accordance with the law.”4 
According to this provision, the violation of a relevant regulation is a 
prerequisite to establishing liability. This requirement, however, is 
contradictory to Article 41 of the EPA: “[a] unit that has caused an 
environmental pollution hazard shall have the obligation to eliminate 
it and make compensation to the unit or individual that suffered direct 
losses.”5 The latter provision introduces strict liability without 
requiring the violation of a regulation. 
 
2 General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Minfa Tongze] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, 
effective Jan. 1, 1987) (China), available at http:// www.china.org.cn/china/legislations 
form2001-2010/2011-02/11/content_21898337.htm. 
3 Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989) (China), available at http://www.china.org 
.cn/english/environment/34356.htm. 
4 General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 124. 
5 Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 41. 
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In Chinese legal scholarship and in case law, debates raged over 
which provision prevailed, as well as how to interpret the violation 
requirement under the GPCL.6 The introduction of a new Tort 
Liability Law (TLL)7 in 2009 has ended these debates. The TLL has a 
specific chapter (Chapter VIII) dealing with environmental liability, 
which reiterates the strict liability for environmental damage, without 
requiring the violation of a relevant regulation: “[w]here any harm is 
caused by environmental pollution, the polluter shall assume the tort 
liability.”8 
Although the environmental liability provisions under the GPCL 
and the EPA have not been formally abrogated,9 the provisions likely 
play a minor future role because victims are expected to rely on the 
new TLL.10 
B. Scope of Liability: Is Natural Resource Damage Covered? 
The provisions mentioned above provide the basis for 
environmental liability in China. However, these provisions do not 
make clear which type of damage is covered. For example, Article 
124 of the GPCL does not clarify what constitutes “damage to 
others.” To apply this provision in practice, one has to consider the 
general provisions under the GPCL. For example, Article 106 
provides that “[c]itizens and legal persons who through their fault 
encroach upon State or collective property or the property or person 
 
6 See Michael Faure & Hu Weiqiang, Towards a Reform of Environmental Liability in 
China: An Economic Analysis, 13 ASIA PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 225, 231–33 (2010) (discussing 
debates over which provision prevailed). 
7 Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhongua Renmin Zongghe Guo 
Qinquan Zeren Fa] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 
2009, effective July 1, 2010) (China), available at http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english 
/law/201001/t20100110_300173.html. 
8 Id. art. 65. 
9 The TLL does not include any provisions on abrogating the inconsistent provision in 
earlier legislation. 
10 Article 83 of the Law on Legislation holds that 
[i]n the case of national law, administrative regulations, local decrees, autonomous 
decrees and special decrees, and administrative or local rules enacted by the same 
body, if a special provision differs from a general provision, the special provision 
shall prevail; if a new provision differs from an old provision, the new provision 
shall prevail. 
Law on Legislation [Lifa Fa] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), art. 83 (China), available at http://www.novexcn 
.com/legislat_law_00.html. 
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of other people shall bear civil liability. Civil liability shall still be 
borne even in the absence of fault, if the law so stipulates.”11 
This provision requires encroachment of property or person to 
establish liability, without using the term “property right” or 
“personal right.”12 The expression is clearer under Article 2 of the 
TLL: 
Those who infringe upon civil rights and interests shall be subject to 
the tort liability according to this Law. ‘Civil rights and interests’ 
used in this Law shall include the right to life, the right to health, 
the right to name, the right to reputation, the right to honor, right to 
self image, right of privacy, marital autonomy, guardianship, 
ownership, usufruct, security interest, copyright, patent right, 
exclusive right to use a trademark, right to discovery, equities, right 
of succession, and other personal and property rights and interests.13 
These provisions use infringement of “civil rights and interest” 
instead of “civil right” as a requirement to establishing liability.14 The 
term “civil rights and interests” is further defined by listing specific 
rights and interests.15 The catchall expression also enables an interest 
to be protected under the TLL even without being established as a 
“civil right” or explicitly included in the list.16 It is still unclear, 
however, whether the damage to the environment itself without 
personal injury and property damage can be compensated under the 
TLL. 
In both the United States and in Europe, this type of damage has 
been explicitly admitted as compensable. For example, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
 
11 General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 
1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 106 (China), available at, http://www.china.org.cn 
/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/content_21898337.htm. 
12 Id. 
13 Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhongua Renmin Zongghe 
Guo Qinquan Zeren Fa]  (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 
26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) art. 2 (China), available at http://www.procedurallaw.cn 
/english/law/201001/t20100110 _300173. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 The language of “and other personal and property rights and interests” in Article 2 of 
the TLL implies that the rights and interests listed before are not exclusive. See Mo Zhang, 
Tort Liabilities and Torts Law: The New Frontier of Chinese Legal Horizon, 10 RICH. J. 
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 415, 429–30 (2011). 
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Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) introduced 
liability for natural resource damage explicitly.17 In U.S. legislation, 
“natural resources” refers to “land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, 
ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources 
belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or 
otherwise controlled by the United States . . . , any state or local 
government or Indian tribe.”18 The scope of natural resources is 
defined by its relationship to the public authority but not by 
ownership.19 Thus not only the public natural resources but also the 
privately owned ones are encompassed under the heading of “natural 
resource damage.” In Europe, the Council Directive on 
Environmental Liability (ELD) established a liability framework for 
three types of environmental damage.20 In this research, the term 
natural resource damage is used, which refers to the damage to the 
environment itself without involving personal injury and property 
damage. However in China, the GPCL, EPA, and the newly adopted 
TLL do not clarify the issue of natural resource damage. It is not 
clear, on the one hand, whether an obligation exists to cleanup and to 
restore the damaged environment; and on the other hand, whether this 
type of damage, such as the enjoyment of the environment, costs of 
preventive measures, or restoration measures are compensable. 
In addition to those general statutes, there are some specific 
environmental statutes in China that contain an environmental 
liability provision, such as the Water Pollution Prevention Act 
 
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2) (2012); see also James 
Boyd, A Market-Based Analysis of Financial Insurance Issues Associated with US Natural 
Resource Damage Liability, in 5 TORT AND INSURANCE LAW: DETERRENCE, 
INSURABILITY AND COMPENSATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 258, 258–302 
(Michael ed., 2003) (discussing, in detail, natural resource damage liability in the United 
States). 
18 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2013). 
19 See James Boyd, Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are 
Bonding and Assurance Rules Fulfilling Their Promise?, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ISSUES IN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
417 (Timothy Swanson ed., 2002). 
20 Directive 2004/35/CE, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 
2004 on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of 
Environmental Damage, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56 [hereinafter ELD], available at http://eur     
-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:143:0056:0075:en:PDF. Instead 
of “natural resource damage,” the term “environmental damage” is used in the ELD, which 
refers to damage to protected species, habitats, waters, and land. Id. art. 2(1). 
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(WPPA),21 the Air Pollution Prevention Act (APPA),22 and the Solid 
Waste Pollution Prevention Act (SWPPA).23 However, neither the 
WPPA nor the APPA have specific relevance for natural resource 
damage. Although Article 85 of the SWPPA obliges polluters to 
restore the damaged environment, there is no practical guidance on 
how to determine the existence of such damage and how to restore the 
environment.24 The only field where damage to the environment is 
explicitly admitted as compensable and an operable procedure exists 
is marine oil pollution. The Marine Environment Protection Act25 
authorizes public authorities to claim for damage and such cases do 
exist in practice.26 
C. Quantification 
Even if natural resource damage is admitted as compensable, a 
practical problem still arises as to how to quantify this type of 
damage. The damaged environmental elements may not always have 
a market value. Moreover, even if they do, the natural resources do 
not have a use value that can be quantified easily. Equally, if not more 
importantly, these resources do not have non-use value. This can 
 
21 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution 
[Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shuiwuran Fangzhi Fa] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2008, effective June 1, 2008), art. 85 (China). 
22 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Atmospheric Pollution [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 2000, effective Sept. 
1, 2000), art. 62 (China), available at http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-09/07/content_298 
77.htm. 
23 Law on the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gutifeiwu 
Wuranhuanjing Fangzhi] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 
29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005), art. 85 (China), available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn 
/1800000121_39_1135_0_7.html. 
24 Id. (“It is necessary to get rid of dangers, compensate losses according to law and 
take measures to restitute to the previous environmental condition if any environmental 
pollution by solid wastes is caused.”). 
25 Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Haiyang Huanjing Baohu Fa] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000) (China), available at 
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071012_656329.htm. 
26 The way in which marine oil pollution is compensated for in China will be discussed 
in further detail in Part IV of this Article. 
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include cultural, esthetic, and ecological values.27 Therefore, how to 
quantify this type of damage is a critical question. 
In the United States, concrete natural resource damage assessment 
rules have been established under CERCLA and OPA.28 After a long 
debate, a restoration-based approach has been established to assess 
natural resource damage. This means that when natural resource 
damage occurs, it should be restored to the initial condition and the 
restoration costs and lost natural resources services during the 
restoration period are compensable.29 When restoration is not possible 
in the United States, other monetary valuation methods can be used.30 
Though these methods are far from perfect and have caused hot 
debates, the assessment rules themselves have provided an 
operational procedure to quantify natural resource damage and have 
led to many restoration efforts in practice.31 
In Europe, even though compensation for environmental damage 
under the ELD is still in its early development stage, the Directive 
itself has provided brief guidance on quantification issues.32 For 
 
27 Use value is derived from the actual use of the environment and can be evaluated by 
market values. Nonuse value, however, cannot be measured by the market value. Usually 
the existence value and instrinsic value are regarded as nonuse values. For a discussion of 
the different types of values natural resources may have, see Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain 
and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse 
Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 898–908 (1994), and Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, 
Measuring Loss of Use Damages in Natural Resource Damage Actions, 30 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 417, 421–24 (2005). 
28 CERCLA authorized the Department of Interior (DOI) to develop assessment rules 
for natural resource damage. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10–11.93 (2013). OPA directed the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to develop natural resource damage 
assessment rules. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.10–990.66. 
29 Initially, a so-called “lesser of rule” was followed under the DOI rules: the damages 
were limited to the lesser of the restoration costs and the diminution of use value. A shift 
towards a restoration-based approach was triggered by two cases: Ohio v. U.S. DOI, 880 
F.2d 432, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and Colorado v. U.S. DOI, 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
30 See Boyd, supra note 17, at 271–75. 
31 Though there is no official data on how many natural resources claims have been 
made after the promulgation of CERCLA and OPA, an Environmental Law Institute 
research study shows that until 2006, there were at least 273 cases involving one or more 
federal trustees submitting claims for natural resource damage. Among those, 132 cases 
were CERCLA related, leading to settlement and judgment values of $722,433,600; and 
48 cases were OPA related, with a value of $126,290,530. See ENVTL. LAW INST., 
MITIGATION OF IMPACTS TO FISH AND WILDLIFE HABITAT: ESTIMATING COSTS AND 
IDENTIFYING OPPORTUNITIES 74, 80 (2007), available at http://www.elistore.org/Data 
/products/d17_16.pdf. 
32 ELD, supra note 20, Annex II. 
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biodiversity damage and damage to protected waters, a restoration-
based approach is also adopted.33 
However, in China, the assessment of natural resource damage 
remains unclear, with the exception of the fishery losses caused by 
water pollution.34 For example, quantifying soil pollution is still 
difficult. Not only is prior information on background levels often 
missing, appropriate standards to evaluate the extent a polluted site 
should be restored are also lacking.35 In response to this situation, the 
government began its effort to develop methodologies to assess 
natural resource damage and recently started trials in some areas.36 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection published a 
Recommendation Method on Assessing Environmental Damage in 
2011.37 The Recommendation gives general guidance on how to 
assess pure environmental damage but is not a binding standard to be 
applied in the court.38 
D. Environmental Insurance 
The above sections addressed the difficulties in establishing 
liability for natural resource damage in the Chinese legal framework. 
However, even when a legal provision on liability for natural resource 
damage is in place, such a provision alone cannot guarantee 
compensation in practice. The damage may be large and can exceed 
the financial capacity of the polluters. In some circumstances the 
polluter may not be identifiable. Those situations will not only lead to 
the environment being unrestored and the damage uncompensated, 
 
33 Id. 
34 See infra Part IV.A. 
35 Interview with Dr. Cai, South-China Inst. of Envtl. Scis., in Guang Zho, China (Aug. 
11, 2011) (interview transcript on file with authors). 
36 Several Opinions on Evaluation of the Environmental Pollution Damage [Guanyu 
Kaizhan Huanjing Wuran Sunhai Jianding Pinggu Gongzuo De Ruogan Yijian] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Envtl. Prot., May 25, 2011, effective May 25, 2011) 
(China). 
37 Recommendation on Methods of Assessing Environmental Damage [Huanjing 
Wuran Sunhai Shue Jisuan Tuijian Fangfa] (promulgated by the Ministry of Envtl. Prot., 
May 25, 2011, effective May 25, 2011) (developed by the Chinese Academy for 
Environment Planning) (China). 
38 Section 5 of the Recommendation provides explicitly that this document mainly 
applies to the pilot areas to guide damage assessment and provide advice in settling 
environmental disputes or judging environmental pollution cases. The Recommendation 
uses soft words, such as  “guide” and “advice”, and is not legally binding. See id. 
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insolvency will allow polluters to externalize harm to society and lead 
to underdeterrence.39 To alleviate such problems, environmental 
insurance and other compensation instruments—such as risk sharing 
pools and environmental funds—and the use of capital markets can 
play a role. 
The most popularly used compensation mechanism to address 
natural resource damage—or more broadly, general environmental 
damage—is insurance.40 The introduction of environmental liability 
insurance is favored in literature in order to guarantee compensation 
and to avoid underdeterrence.41 Literature even argues for the 
adoption of mandatory insurance when there is serious concern about 
insolvency.42 However, most Chinese legislation, including the newly 
adopted TLL, is silent on compulsory insurance,43 with again the only 
exception being marine oil pollution.44 In this field, there is not only a 
legal obligation for certain types of ships to seek insurance coverage, 
but also in practice, insurance coverage does exist for parts of natural 
resource damage.45 
Environmental insurance has a rather short history in China. The 
government only recently issued a policy to encourage the 
 
39 See Peter-J. Jost, Limited Liability and the Requirement to Purchase Insurance, 16 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 259, 259–76 (1996); Mattias K. Polborn, Mandatory Insurance at 
the Judgment-Proof Problem, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 141–46 (1998). 
40 For the discussion about using insurance to cover environmental liability, see 
Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 942, 949–50 (1988); Jeffrey Kehne, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based 
Incentives: Financial Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403 (1986); 
Haitao Yin et al., Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private 
Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 325 (2011). 
41 See, e.g., MICHAEL G. FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE: 
INSURANCE AND EXPANDING SYSTEMIC RISKS 211–20 (2003). 
42 When a serious insolvency risk exists, the insured only have incentives to buy 
insurance up to his amount of assets rather than the whole damage he may cause. Under 
this situation, compulsory insurance will make them internalize the whole costs they 
create. See Michael Faure & David Grimeaud, Financial Assurance Issues of 
Environmental Liability, in 5 TORT AND INSURANCE LAW: DETERRENCE, INSURABILITY, 
AND COMPENSATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY, supra note 17, at 7. Gerhard 
Wagner, (Un)insurability and the Choice Between Market Insurance and Public 
Compensation Systems, in 22 TORT AND INSURANCE LAW: SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION 
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 87, 110 (William Van Boom & Michael Faure 
eds., 2007). 
43 See also Faure, supra note 6, at 237. 
44 See infra Part IV.C. 
45 For example, the China Shipowners Mutual Assurance Association, a Protection & 
Indemnity Club in China, has a long history in covering pollution liability. See infra Part 
IV.C. 
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development of an environmental insurance market. The document, 
Opinion on the Development of Environmental Pollution Liability 
Insurance, was issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
and China Insurance Regulatory Commission in 2007.46 It requires 
local authorities to make efforts in environmental liability insurance 
research and experiments.47 
In practice, the environmental insurance market has developed 
rapidly since 2007.48 There are already several types of products 
available in the market, such as a general liability insurance policy 
with an extension to pollution risks, stand-alone environmental 
liability insurance, and premises pollution liability insurance.49 
Theoretically, without specific exclusions, product liability insurance 
and property damage insurance may also cover some types of 
environmental damage.50 However, the market is still in a stage of 
early development. Many limits and difficulties remain, such as the 
lack of incentives to buy insurance because of the low risk of liability 
and the adverse selection problem, meaning that only high-risk 
polluters have incentives to seek insurance coverage.51 Recently, the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection issued a document that requires 
some industries with high environmental risks, such as the ones 
related to heavy metals (mining, smelting, chemicals), to obtain 
environmental liability insurance.52 Hence, a mandatory 
environmental insurance policy is developing. However, given the 
recent history of such a document, how mandatory insurance will be 
 
46 Opinion on the Development of Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance Guanyu 
[Huanjing Wuran Zeren Baoxian Gongzuo De Zhidao Yijian] (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Envtl. Prot. & China Insurance Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 4, 2007) (China). 
47 Id. 
48 Zhou Daoxu, Fahui Baoxian Zuoyong, & Jianshe Lvse Jingji, Guanyu Jianli Woguo 
Huanjing Wuran Zeren Baoxian Zhidu de Ruogan Sikao [Using Insurance to Build a 
Green Economy: A Few Thoughts on Developing Environmental Liability Insurance], INS. 
INST. CHINA, http://www.iic.org.cn/D_resZL/index_lw_view_read.php?id=10121 (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
49 Interview with Ms. Zhang Jing and Ms. Jean Wu, representatives of the Munich 
Reinsurance Co., in Beijing, China (Sept. 15, 2011) (transcript on file with the authors). 
50 This, however, is rarely used in practice and thus remains a theoretical possibility. 
51 Interview with Ms. Zhang Jing and Ms. Jean Wu, supra note 49. 
52 Opinions on Experiments of Mandatory Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance 
[Guanyu Kaizhan Huanjing Wuran Qianghi Zeren Baoxian Shidian Gongzuo De Zhidao 
Yijian] (promulgated by Ministry of Envtl. Prot., Feb. 21, 2013) (China). 
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established in China and whether it will play a significant role will 
have to wait to be seen. 
E. Marine Oil Pollution as an Example 
The above sections show that many obstacles exist in China in 
compensating for natural resource damage. On the one hand, the legal 
basis is lacking in establishing liability for natural resource damage; 
on the other hand, the penetration rate of environmental insurance is 
still low.53 This makes the restoration of and compensation for natural 
resource damage rare. There is one exception, however, in the marine 
oil pollution area. Legislation explicitly admits the compensable 
nature of certain types of natural resource damage, such as prevention 
costs and restoration costs. Moreover, some standards exist to assess 
fishery losses, including the natural fishery losses. 
Not only are legal obstacles in establishing liability alleviated, but 
some compensation instruments are in place or under development to 
cover oil pollution damage, such as insurance/risk sharing pools and 
oil funds.54 Hence, this article focuses on marine oil pollution to show 
how natural resource damage is compensated in China, and how the 
regime can be further improved to promote the compensation for and 
prevention of natural resource damage. After briefly presenting the 
compensation models in the international regime and in the United 
States, we will return to the case of China with a focus on the 
compensation of natural resource damage caused by marine oil 
pollution. 
II 
THE COMPENSATION SYSTEM IN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
FOR NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE CAUSED BY MARINE OIL 
POLLUTION 
A. Overview of the International Compensation Regime of Marine 
Oil Pollution Damage 
The international regime specifically dealing with marine oil 
pollution compensation has been developing since the late 1960s as a 
 
53 See Zhou DaoXu, Woguo Huanjing Wuran Zeren Baoxian Fazhan de Lujing Xuanze 
Yu Zhidu Gouxiang [Research on the Socialized Methods to Manage Environmental 
Pollution Risks: The Pathway and Regime for the Development of Environmental Liability 
Insurance], 18 ENVTL. ECON. 23 (2011). 
54 See infra Part IV. 
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reaction to some major oil spill incidents. Initially, in response to the 
Torrey Canyon spill in 1967, two international conventions were 
introduced to provide compensation for pollution victims. These 
conventions are the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage of 1969 (CLC of 1969)55 and the International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage of 1971 (Fund Convention 
of 1971).56 
The CLC of 1969 imposes strict liability exclusively on the 
registered shipowner up to a certain amount.57 It also requires 
compulsory insurance or a financial guarantee for pollution liability.58 
The Fund Convention of 1971 was later adopted to provide a second 
tier of compensation, given that the strict liability of the CLC of 1969 
was considered harsh.59 With the contribution of oil cargo owners to 
the Fund, it was believed that the harsh burden on the shipping 
industry could be alleviated to a certain extent.60 Since then, an 
international regime on marine oil pollution compensation has been 
established. 
Later catastrophic oil pollution incidents illustrated the 
insufficiency of the international regime (e.g., the Amoco Cadiz in 
1978, Tanio in 1980, and Exxon Valdez in 1989). As a result, the 
international conventions were revised in 1992,61 whereby the amount 
 
55 See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 1969, 
Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CLC of 1969]. The CLC of 1969 was later 
amended in 1992. CLC of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 27, 1992, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter CLC of 1992], 
reprinted in INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, LIABILITY AND 
COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE 5–17 (2011). 
56 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter 
Fund Convention of 1971]. 
57 CLC of 1969, supra note 55. 
58 Id. 
59 Fund Convention of 1971, supra note 56. 
60 Hui Wang, Shifts in Governance in the International Regime of Marine Oil Pollution 
Compensation: A Legal History Perspective, in 21 TORT AND INSURANCE LAW: SHIFTS IN 
COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 197, 218–19 (Michael Faure & Albert 
Verheij eds., 2007). 
61 In fact, the international conventions were first revised in 1984. See Protocol of 1984 
to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (May 
25, 1984), reprinted in 15 J. MAR. L & COM. 613 (1984). However, the entry into force of 
the Protocols in 1984 relied on the ratification of the United States. According to Article  
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of compensation was substantially increased and the scope of 
compensation was expanded. Despite the changes, the general 
principles of liability sharing between the shipping and oil industry, 
including strict liability, limitation of liability, compulsory insurance, 
and channeling of liability remain. 
Again, later incidents, Erika in 1999 and Prestige in 2002, triggered 
further changes to the international conventions. The amount of 
compensation was increased by approximately fifty percent in 2000.62 
Later in 2003, a Supplementary Fund Protocol was adopted to 
establish a so-called Supplementary Fund to provide a third tier of 
compensation.63 Membership in the Supplementary Fund is optional, 
and any state that is a member of the 1992 Fund may join the 
Supplementary Fund.64 As of October 4, 2013, twenty-nine states 
have ratified or acceded to the Supplementary Fund Protocol,65 123 
states have ratified or acceded to the CLC of 1992,66 and 111 states 
had ratified or acceded to the Fund Convention of 1992.67 
 
13 of the 1984 Protocol, it only enters into force “twelve months following the date on 
which ten States including six States each with not less than one million units of gross 
tanker tonnage have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession with the Secretary-General of the Organization.” Id. art. 13. The United States is 
one of the six countries. Since the United States decided to take its own action through the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 106-580, 104 Stat. 484 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
2701–2762), it was clear that the United States would never ratify the international 
conventions. On the other hand, the occurrence of major pollution incidents shows that 
changes in the Protocol of 1984, such as an increased amount of compensation, were 
needed. As a result, major changes in the Protocol of 1984 were adopted in the CLC of 
1992 and the need for U.S. ratification was eliminated. See Wang, supra note 60, at 204–
05. 
62 Wang, supra note 60, at 209. 
63 Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, May 16, 2003, 2004 O.J. 
(L 78/32) (Eur.) [hereinafter Supplementary Fund Protocol], reprinted in INT’L OIL 
POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, supra note 55, at 43. The Supplementary Fund 
Protocol entered into force on March 3, 2005. INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION 
FUNDS, supra note 55, at 3. 
64 INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, supra note 55, at 3. 
65 Parties to the International Liability Compensation Conventions, IOPC FUNDS, 
http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/membership /map/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
66 IMO, STATUS OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS IN RESPECT OF 
WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION OR ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL 
PERFORMS DEPOSITARY OR OTHER FUNCTIONS 262 (Sept. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%20 
2013.pdf. In contrast, only thirty-six states are parties to the CLC of 1969. Id. at 244. 
67 Parties to the International Liability Compensation Conventions, supra note 65. 
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The International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs has 
introduced, on a voluntary basis, two agreements to increase the 
maximum amount of compensation for small tankers (STOPIA: Small 
Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement)68 and to indemnify 
the Supplementary Fund for fifty percent of the compensation 
payments it has made to the claimants if the ship involved in the 
incident is covered by the agreement (TOPIA: Tanker Oil Pollution 
Indemnification Agreement).69 These two voluntary agreements went 
into force in 2006. 
The CLC of 1992 replaced the CLC of 1969.70 Although the Fund 
of 1971 and the Fund of 1992 are coexisting, the Fund of 1971 does 
not handle new cases and only focuses on the unsettled cases.71 
Therefore, the discussion in this Article will mainly focus on the 1992 
Conventions. 
B. Natural Resource Damage Compensation Under the 
International Regime 
1. Basis of Liability 
The CLC of 1992 provides that the registered shipowner shall be 
held strictly liable for pollution damage caused by discharge of oil 
from the ship.72 Moreover, it further provides that the liability is 
exclusively imposed on the shipowner, and there is a list of parties 
whose liability for oil pollution damage compensation is explicitly 
excluded.73 This is the so-called channeling provision74 whereby the 
 
68 INT’L GRP. PROT. & INDEM. CLUBS, SMALL TANKER OIL POLLUTION 
INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT (STOPIA) (2006), available at http://www.iopcfunds.org 
/fileadmin/IOPC_Upload/Downloads/English/STOPIA-TOPIA.pdf. 
69 INT’L GRP. PROT. & INDEM. CLUBS, TANKER OIL POLLUTION INDEMNIFICATION 
AGREEMENT (TOPIA) (2006), available at http://www.iopcfunds.org/fileadmin/IOPC 
_Upload/Downloads/English/STOPIA-TOPIA.pdf. 
70 CLC of 1992, supra note 55. 
71 Parties to the International Liability and Compensation Conventions, supra note 65. 
72 CLC of 1992, supra note 55, art. III(1); see also id. art. I(3) (“‘Owner’ means the 
person or person, registered as the owner of the ship or, in the absence of registration, the 
person or persons owning the ship. However, in the case of a ship owned by a State and 
operated by a company which in that State is registered as the ship’s operator, ‘owner’ 
shall mean such company.”). 
73 Id. art. III(4). 
74 See infra Part V.B.1. 
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liability is directed at one particular party—in this case, the 
shipowner. 
2. Amount of Compensation 
Under the international regime, the liable party is not required to 
pay the full amount of compensation, but instead, his liability is 
capped at a certain amount.75 This mechanism of limited liability has 
a long tradition in maritime law. However, at its origin—when it 
applied to the shipowner, who limited his liability vis-a-vis the cargo 
owner—it applied in a contractual situation.76 In such a setting, the 
parties can negotiate in advance on the care to be taken, and a limited 
liability will be reflected in the contract price, that being the freight.77 
Whereas in the case of marine oil pollution, when the shipowner 
limits his liability towards the victims who do not stand in a 
contractual situation with the shipowner, the care taken by the 
shipowner will be suboptimal, and the costs of pollution incidents will 
be externalized.78 
The amounts of compensation under the CLC have been increased 
a few times since its adoption. The table below provides a summary 
of the compensation amount under the international regime through 
history. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 CLC of 1992, supra note 55, art. V. 
76 Wang, supra note 60, at 220. 
77 When a contractual relationship exists, theoretically, the two parties can negotiate for 
the content of the contract if the transaction costs are not prohibitively expansive. This can 
lead to efficiency automatically without legal intervention. However, in practice, the 
contract may not necessarily lead to efficiency given the information asymmetry and 
different bargaining power of the two parties. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 291–92 (5th ed. 2009). 
78 For a further discussion, see Michael Faure & Hui Wang, Financial Caps for Oil 
Pollution Damage: A Historical Mistake?, 32 MARINE POL’Y 592 (2008). 
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Table 1: Amount of Compensation by the Shipowner Under the 
International Regime79 
 CLC 1969 (SDR) CLC 1992 (SDR) 
2000 Protocol 
(SDR) 
Ships ≤ 5,000 
tons 
133 (204.41 USD) 
per ton 
3 million (4.61 
million USD) 
4.51 million (6.93 
million USD) 
Ships > 5,000 
tons 
133 (204.41 USD) 
per ton 
3 million (4.61 
million USD) +  
420 (645.5  
USD)/additional 
ton 
4.51 million (6.93 
million USD)+ 631 
(969.8)/additional 
ton 
Overall limit 14 million (21.52 
million USD) 
59.7 million 
(91.75 million 
USD) 
89.77 million 
(137.97 million 
USD) 
3. Scope of Compensation of Natural Resource Damage 
Under the CLC of 1992, the concept of pollution damage is defined 
as 
(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination 
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, 
wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that 
compensation for impairment of the environment other than 
loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of 
reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to 
be undertaken; 
(b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage 
caused by preventive measures.80 
This definition delimits the scope of compensable environmental 
damage. It provides that environmental damage per se is compensable 
but only so far as it is reasonable and only where reinstatement is 
actually undertaken or to be undertaken.81 However, the scope of 
environmental damage under the international regime is not so easy to 
demarcate in practice. Disputes often take place on the quantification 
of damage, the state as environmental trustee, and ecological 
 
79 The original unit of account used in the Conventions is special drawing right (SDR) 
as defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For the convenience of comparison, 
all the units of account mentioned in this article are changed to USD as per exchange rate 
provided by the IMF on December 28, 2012: 1 SDR=1.53692 USD. 
80 CLC of 1992, supra note 55, art. I(6). 
81 David Wilkinson, Moving the Boundaries of Compensable Environmental Damage 
Caused by Marine Oil Spills: The Effect of Two New International Protocols, 5 J. ENVTL. 
L. 71, 84–85 (1993). 
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restoration.82 It is often up to the national courts to decide where the 
lawsuits are brought and to interpret the meaning of vague terms such 
as “reasonable measures.”83 
Although there is no authoritative interpretation of the international 
conventions, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund has 
developed, through years of experience with handling compensation 
claims, a Claims Manual containing specific criteria for the 
assessment of environmental damage.84 The Claims Manual is not 
designed as an authoritative interpretation of the international 
conventions but rather is meant to assist claimants by giving a general 
overview of the Fund’s obligation to pay contribution.85 However, the 
Claims Manual may serve as a useful guideline. 
As far as compensation for environmental damage is concerned, 
the Claims Manual provides that 
[c]ompensation is payable for the costs of reasonable reinstatement 
measures aimed at accelerating natural recovery of environmental 
damage. Contributions may be made to the costs of post-spill 
studies provided that they relate to damage which falls within the 
definition of pollution damage under the Conventions, including 
studies to establish the nature and extent of environmental damage 
caused by an oil spill and to determine whether or not reinstatement 
measures are necessary and feasible.86 
The Claims Manual further provides that “reasonable costs 
associated with the capture, cleaning and rehabilitation of wildlife, in 
particular birds, mammals and reptiles” are to be compensated.87 
For the criteria of “reasonableness,” there should be a sufficiently 
close link of causation between the loss or damage and the 
contamination. Such a close link may be considered in the light of 
such factors as (1) “[t]he geographic proximity of the claimant’s 
business activity to the contaminated area”; (2) “[t]he degree to which 
a claimant’s business is economically dependent on an affected 
 
82 Michael Mason, Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage: Examining the Evolving 
Scope for Environmental Compensation in the International Regime, 27 MARINE POL’Y 1, 
3–5 (2003). 
83 For a discussion of the different explanations of the compensable in member states, 
see Mason, supra note 82. 
84 See INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUND 1992, CLAIMS MANUAL (Dec. 
2008), available at www.iopcfunds.org/uploads/tx_iopcpublications/2008_claims_manual 
_e.pdf. 
85 Id. at 5. 
86 Id. at 13. 
87 Id. at 12. 
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resource”; (3) “[t]he extent to which a claimant had alternative 
sources of supply or business opportunities”; and (4) “[t]he extent to 
which a claimant’s business forms an integral part of the economic 
activity within the area affected by the spill.”88 Moreover, claims for 
compensation for environmental damage, calculated by theoretical 
models in accordance with abstract models, are inadmissible.89 
Punitive damage based on the degree of fault of the wrongdoer is also 
not compensable.90 
C. Compensation Instruments for Oil Pollution Damage 
1. Insurance 
To guarantee the availability of compensation, the CLC regime 
requires compulsory financial security. The CLC requires the owner 
of a ship registered in a contracting state and carrying more than 
2,000 tons of oil as cargo to maintain insurance or other financial 
security up to his limits of liability.91 In addition to insurance, the 
financial security can also be a bank guarantee or a certificate 
delivered by an international compensation fund.92 The most 
popularly used instrument is insurance, especially protection and 
indemnity policies. 
Insurance for ocean-going ships is mainly provided by Protection 
and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs.93 Thirteen P&I Clubs form the 
International Group of P&I Clubs (the Group).94 The Group arranges 
reinsurance together for the Clubs.95 It is reported that the thirteen 
principal clubs provide liability cover for approximately ninety 
 
88 Id. at 29. 
89 Id. at 36. 
90 Id. 
91 CLC of 1992, supra note 55, art. VII(1). 
92 Id. art. VII(2). 
93 See 5 FAURE & HARTLIEF, supra note 41, at 165–66; T.G. Coghlin, Protection and 
Indemnity Clubs, 1984 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 403, 403–16. 
94 Welcome to the International Group of P&I Clubs, INT’L GRP. P&I CLUBS, 
http://www.igpandi.org/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). 
95 Id. 
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percent of the world’s ocean-going tonnage96 and ninety-eight percent 
of the world’s tanker fleet.97 
P&I coverage usually includes “unlimited reimbursement for 
claims arising from the following: 1) liabilities in respect of persons, 
2) liability in respect of cargo, 3) collision with hips or with fixed and 
floating objects, 4) salvage, 5) compulsory wreck removal, 6) fines 
imposed by government agencies, 7) quarantine expenses, 8) towage 
liabilities, 9) “sue and labor” and legal costs, 10) any other liabilities 
which the club’s directors deem proper to cover, and 11) limited 
reimbursement for “oil pollution claims which arise from the entered 
vessels.”98 The oil pollution claim means “a liability, cost, loss or 
expense, howsoever incurred, in respect of or relating to an escape or 
discharge of oil or any threat or consequence of such escape or 
discharge, but excluding liability for loss of or damage to such oil.”99 
The term “liability” in this expression is determined by international 
conventions and national legislations applicable in each case.100 One 
important source in that respect is the CLC. 
One important characteristic of P&I Clubs is that they are risk-
sharing agreements rather than private commercial insurance.101 The 
 
96 Id. 
97 BRIT. MAR. TECH. LTD, WORK PACKAGE 2.1–QUALITY & EFFICIENCY 8 (Oct. 
2005), available at http://www.maritime-transport.net/mtso/downloads/Public_Informa 
tion/MTCP_report_Maritime_Insurance_Study.pdf. Id. 
98 Norman J. Ronneberg, Jr., An Introduction to Protection & Indemnity Clubs and the 
Marine Insurance They Provide, 3 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 1, 7–9 (1990). Ronneberg’s analysis 
was based on the Swedish Club’s 1990 rulebook. SVERIGES ANGFARTYGS ASSURANS 
FORENING, 1990 RULEBOOK (1990). The similar coverage can also be found in the 2010 
rulebook of the United Kingdom P&I Club. U.K. P&I CLUB, LIST OF CORRESPONDENTS 
RULES AND BYE-LAWS (2010), available at http://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads 
/uk-pi/Documents/2010RulesandCorrespondents_01.pdf. In the rulebook, the “unlimited” 
reimbursement does not mean that the Club should pay the full costs which fall into the 
categories; instead, the reimbursement is subject to the limitation of liability set by law. Id. 
at 35. For oil pollution claims, the compensable sums are determined by Directors of the 
Club. Id. 
99 U.K. P&I CLUB, supra note 98, at 35. 
100 Paul Bennett, Environmental Governance and Private Actors: Enrolling Insurers in 
International Maritime Regulation, 19 POL. GEOGRAPHY 875, 888 (2000). 
101 Risk-sharing agreement means the sharing of potential losses among the participants 
of the pool. For the discussion of the characteristics of risk-sharing agreements, see 
Michael Faure, Alternative Compensation Mechanisms as Remedies for Uninsurability of 
Liability, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 455 (2004). 
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shipowners are both insurers and insured.102 This gives them 
incentives to exercise mutual monitoring via the P&I Clubs.103 
The International Group provides reinsurance for the P&I Clubs. 
At this moment, for the shipowners’ policies, each Club retains the 
first $8 million as their retentions.104 The amount between $8 million 
and $6.09 billion is divided among all the Clubs.105 The captive 
insurer of the Group—Hydra Insurance Company and reinsurance 
with the international insurance market—also plays an important role 
in providing reinsurance for the upper layers.106 This brings the upper 
limit of the reinsurance program to $3,070 million. In this amount, the 
limit for compensation for oil pollution is limited to $1,070 million.107 
The large market share of P&I Clubs and the potential restrictions on 
competition by its Pooling agreement and International Group 
Agreement have lead to anticompetition concerns from the European 
Commission.108 
2. Compensation Funds 
In addition to the financial security, compensation funds are also 
established to complement the compensation available from the CLC 
of 1992. There are three international funds at this moment. The 
IOPC Fund of 1971, established under the Fund Convention of 1971, 
has been denunciated by most countries, and the Fund Convention 
 
102 See Di Jin & Hauke Kite-Powell, Environmental Liability, Martine Insurance and 
An Optimal Risk Sharing Strategy for Marine Oil Transport, 10 MARINE RESOURCE 
ECON. 1, 4 (1995). 
103 For a discussion of the deterrent effect of risk-sharing agreements, see Göran Skogh, 
A European Nuclear Accident Pool, 33 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 274 (2008). 
104 IG of P&I Associations, AM. CLUB, http://www.american-club.com/page 
/international-group-of-pi-associations (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 International Group of P and I Associations, AM. CLUB, http://www.american-club 
.com/files/files/2013_Reinsurance_Diagram.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
108 The European Commission opened formal proceedings to investigate whether the 
agreements between the P&I Clubs might infringe upon European antitrust rules. 
Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Probe into Marine Insurance Agreements, EUROPA 
(Aug. 26, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1072_en.htm. This 
investigation closed in 2012 with the conclusion that the investigation cannot confirm the 
concerns over antitrust issues. Antitrust: Commission Closes Investigation in P&I Clubs 
Case, EUROPA (Aug. 1, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-873_en.htm. 
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ceased to be in force as of May 2002.109 The current maximum 
compensation under the 1992 Fund, after an increase in 2000, is 203 
million SDR (311.99 million USD) (including the payment under the 
CLC of 1992), and the compensation under the Supplementary Fund 
reaches 750 million SDR (1152.69 million USD) (including the 
payment under the 1992 Conventions).110 
The total amount available for compensating oil pollution damage 
under the international regimes is provided in Table 2. 
Table 2: Compensation for Pollution Damage Under the International 
Regime 
 CLC 1969 
(SDR) CLC 1992 (SDR) 2000 Protocol (SDR) 
Ships ≤ 
5,000 tons 
133 (204.41 
USD) per ton 
3 million (4.61 
million USD) 
4.51 million (6.93 
million USD) 
Ships > 
5,000 tons 
133 (204.41 
USD)per ton  
3 million (4.61 
million USD)+ 420 
(645.5 
USD)/additional 
ton 
4.51 million (6.93 
million USD) + 631 
(969.8 USD)/additional 
ton 
Aggregate 
amount 
14 million 
(21.52 million 
USD) 
59.7 million (91.75 
million USD) 
89.77 million (137.97 
million USD) 
 IOPC Fund 
1971 (SDR) 
IOPC Fund 1992 
(SDR) 
2000 Protocol (SDR) 
Overall limit  60 million 
(92.22 million 
USD) 
135 million 
(207.48 million 
USD) 
203 million (311.99 
million USD) 
 
III 
COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE 
CAUSED BY MARINE OIL POLLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Overview of the U.S. Regime 
The United States has participated vigorously in the discussion on 
an international regime for marine oil pollution compensation, but it 
never ratified any of the international conventions. This is largely due 
 
109 The Old Regime: The 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund 
Convention, IOPC FUNDS, http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/legal-framework/the-old      
-regime-1969-clc-and-1971-fund-convention/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). 
110 The 1992 Fund Convention, IOPC FUNDS, http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/legal 
-framework/1992-fund-convention-and-supplementary-fund-protocol/ (last visited Nov. 6, 
2013).  
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to the dissatisfaction with the international regime, such as “the pre-
emption of states laws, low-liability limits,” and channeling liability 
to shipowners.111 When the Exxon Valdez accident occurred in 
Alaska in 1989, the U.S. Congress quickly passed OPA in 1990, 
which provides the basic compensation system at the federal level in 
the U.S.112 OPA has some similarities with the international regime, 
such as strict liability and limited liability with compulsory financial 
guarantee.113 However, it has some substantial differences as well: the 
scope of compensable damage is much wider, liability is not 
channeled, and higher liability limits apply with more possibilities for 
the potential responsible parties to lose their right to limit their 
liability.114 OPA does not preempt state laws, which means that states 
can still impose additional liability or financial responsibility.115 
B. Compensation System for Natural Resource Damage Under OPA 
1. Basis of Liability 
As in the CLC, OPA also imposes liability on the responsible 
parties.116 Unlike the international regime established through the 
CLC, OPA does not channel liability to one particular party but 
provides a joint and several liability of the shipowner, operator, and 
demise charterer.117 
2. Amount of Compensation 
OPA also establishes limits on oil pollution liability for different 
types of facilities. With the exception of an offshore facility, a cap is 
established for the total sum of removal costs and damages.118 The 
 
111 Michael G. Faure & Hui Wang, Civil Liability and Compensation for Marine 
Pollution-Lessons to be Learned for Offshore Oil Spills, 8 OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 
INTELLIGENCE 1, 3 (2010). 
112 Steven Swanson, OPA 90(10): The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 After Ten Years, 32 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 135, 135 (2001). 
113 For an introduction to the liability and compensation system under OPA, see Albert 
Verheij, Shifts in Governance: Oil Pollution, in 21 TORT AND INSURANCE LAW: SHIFTS IN 
COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, supra note 60, at 133, 170–75. 
114 For a comparison between these two systems, see id. at 133–95. See also infra Part 
V. 
115 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (2012). 
116 Id. § 2702(a). 
117 Id. § 2701(32)(A). 
118 Id. § 2704(a). 
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cap is the greater of a per incident cap and a per gross ton cap.119 In 
2006, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act (CGMTA) 
increased the cap.120 The CGMTA also established different caps for 
single-hull and double-hull tankers.121 In 2009, the Coast Guard made 
a further increase to the cap.122 
Table 3: Comparison of Liability Limits Under OPA 90 and the Coast 
Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006. 
Vessel OPA 90 liability limits (USD) 
2006 (2009) liability limits 
(USD) 
Single hull tanker > 
3,000GT 
1,200/GT or 10 
million  
3,000 (3,200)/GT or 22 
million (23.496 million) 
Single hull tanker 
≤3,000 GT 
1,200/GT or 2 
million  
3,000 (3,200)/GT or 6 million 
(6.408 million) 
Double hull tanker > 
3,000GT 
1,200/GT or 10 
million  
1,900 (2,100)/GT or 16 
million (17.088 million) 
Double hull tanker 
≤3,000 GT 
1,200/GT or 2 
million 
1,900 (2,100)/GT or 4 million 
(4.272 million) 
Any vessel other than 
a tanker 
600/GT or  0.5 
million 
950 (1,000)/GT or 0.8 million 
(854,400) 
First, the single-hull tanker mentioned in the CGMTA includes 
single-hull tankers with double sides only or a double bottom only.123 
Second, the amount of limitation is always the higher of the two 
amounts in comparison.124 In 2009, the Coast Guard made its first 
consumer-price index (CPI) adjustment to the liability limits, 
increased the limits for double-hull tankers from 1,900 to 2,000 USD 
per gross ton, and increased single-hull tankers from 3,000 to 3,200 
USD per gross ton.125 
In spite of those caps, a responsible party can lose its right to 
limitation if the incident was proximately caused by “gross 
negligence or willful misconduct of” or “the violation of an applicable 
Federal safety, construction, or operating regulation.”126 A responsible 
 
119 Id. 
120 Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-241, 120 
Stat. 516. 
121 Id. 
122 Consumer Price Index Adjustments of Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Limits of 
Liability—Vessels and Deepwater Ports, 74 Fed. Reg. 31357 (July 1, 2009). 
123 Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 § 603(a)(1)(A). 
124 Id. § 603(a). 
125 Consumer Price Index Adjustments of Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Limits of Liability, 
74 Fed. Reg. at 31360. 
126 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
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party may also face unlimited liability if it fails to report an incident, 
provide requested cooperation in connection with removal activities, 
or comply with an order of the President.127 Even when a responsible 
party can revoke the limitation under OPA, the party may still face 
unlimited liability under applicable state law. 
3. Scope of Compensation of Natural Resource Damage 
OPA allows compensation for the removal costs. Under OPA, 
“‘remove’ or ‘removal’” means “containment and removal of oil or a 
hazardous substance from water and shorelines or the taking of other 
actions as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the 
public health or welfare.”128 In order to clean up, removal is the first 
step taken after oil pollution. Broadly speaking, removal cost is also 
one part of natural resource damage. But the United States treats 
removal costs differently from other damages, including natural 
resource damage. 
Under OPA, responsible parties are liable for removal costs and 
damages.129 The term “damages” includes the following: natural 
resources, real or personal property, subsistence use, revenues, profits 
and earning capacity, and public services.130 It is clear from this 
definition that the term “natural resource damage” does not include 
removal costs. This dichotomy is different from the structure in the 
ELD, under which the term “environmental damage” includes both 
the emergency response and restoration afterwards.131 Hence, when 
discussing the compensation for ecological damage in the United 
States, one should bear in mind that both removal costs and natural 
resource damage are relevant. Removals are undertaken immediately 
to prevent or mitigate the damage. Only when there is still damage 
 
127 Id. § 2704(c)(2)(A)–(C). 
128 Id. § 2701(30). 
129 Id. § 2702(a). 
130 Id. § 2702(b)(2)(A)–(F). 
131 According to the ELD, when there is an imminent threat of environmental damage, 
the operator shall take preventive measures and remedial measures. ELD, supra note 20, 
art. 5. The operator shall bear the costs of these actions and if the competent authorities 
have taken such measures themselves, they shall recover the costs from the operator. Id. 
art. 8. The term “preventive measures” is defined as “any measures taken in response to an 
event, act or omission that has created an imminent threat of environmental damage, with 
a view to preventing or minimising that damage.” Id. art. 2. So it is a concept similar to 
emergency response in the U.S. law. 
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left after the removal is it necessary to make a natural resource 
damage assessment to quantify the remaining damage and restore the 
environment. 
How to determine the scope and quantify the damage has long been 
a problem perplexing people when calculating the damage to the 
environment. OPA gives a definition to the term “natural resource 
damage,” which includes “(A) the costs of restoring, rehabilitating, 
replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of, the damage natural 
resources; (B) the diminution in value of those natural resources 
pending restoration; plus (C) the reasonable cost of assessing those 
damages.”132 
This definition is quite broad. Restoration is used as the primary 
method to evaluate the loss of natural resources and the diminution of 
services.133 In addition to restoration costs, other alternatives and 
interim losses pending the restoration are also compensable.134 OPA 
authorizes federal authorities, state authorities, and Indian tribes as 
trustees of natural resources to assess and quantify the damage.135 It 
also requires the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) to promulgate regulations for the assessment of natural 
resource damage.136 The assessment made according to these 
regulations has the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption.137 
In 1996, NOAA promulgated the final rule concerning natural 
resource damage assessments.138 This regulation prescribes a concrete 
procedure and assessment method. Under the NOAA assessment rule, 
restoration is defined as any action to “restore, rehabilitate, replace, or 
acquire the equivalent of” the damaged natural resources.139 To 
compensate for interim losses, the NOAA rule also adopts a 
restoration-based approach: compensatory restoration is allowed to 
compensate for the lost “natural resources and services that occur 
from the date of the incident until recovery.”140 When determining 
 
132 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1)(A)–(C). 
133 VALERIE ANN LEE ET AL., THE NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
DESKBOOK: A LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 16 (reprt. 2007). 
134 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1). 
135 Id. § 2706(c). 
136 Id. § 2706(e)(1). 
137 Id. § 2706(e)(2). 
138 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440 (Jan. 5, 1996) (codified at 
15 C.F.R. pt. 990). 
139 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2013). 
140 Id. 
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compensatory restoration, trustees should use a resource-to-resource 
or service-to-service approach to compensate for the lost natural 
resources service or value.141 If these approaches are not possible, 
trustees can use other evaluation techniques to “estimate the dollar 
value of the lost services and select the scale of the restoration action 
that has a cost equivalent to the lost value.”142 A variety of valuation 
techniques may be used to calculate the monetary value, including the 
disputed contingent valuation technique.143 
According to OPA and the NOAA assessment regulation, an 
assessment can be made in one of two ways: either the trustees can 
conduct the assessment and make claims against the responsible 
parties for the costs, or the trustees can conduct the assessment 
together with the participation of the responsible parties.144 The most 
common approach would be a cooperative assessment involving both 
the trustees and responsible parties in the assessment procedures.145 A 
cooperative approach is desirable because it can promote fast 
restoration and avoid costly and time-consuming litigation. An early 
involvement of the responsible parties and even insurers can also 
make the risks more predictable for the insurers and can thus enhance 
the insurability of natural resource damage. Though it has been 
subject to many challenges since its promulgation, the NOAA 
assessment regulation provides practicable guidance in tackling the 
debatable and difficult task of natural resource damage assessment.146 
 
141 Id. § 990.53(d)(2). See Keith B. Letourneau & Wesley T. Welmaker, The Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990: Federal Judicial Interpretation Through the End of the Millennium, 
12 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 147, 188 (2000) (“Resource-to-resource restoration actions are 
designed to restore the damaged natural resource to an equivalent quantity of the same or 
comparable resource. . . . A service-to-service restoration action is one designed to restore 
lost services to an equivalent quantity.”). 
142 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(3)(ii). 
143 Letourneau & Welmaker, supra note 141. A contingent valuation method is a 
method to value natural resources by doing surveys and asking people what monetary 
value they would like to place on certain resources. It is not based on actual market 
transactions but is hypothetical, assuming people will respond to the surveys as in an 
actual transaction. See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. 
REV. 269, 315–19 (1989). 
144 33 U.S.C. § 2706(a)(c) (2012); 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c). 
145 Craig H. Allen, Proving Natural Resource Damage under OPA 90: Out with the 
Rebuttable Presumption, in with APA-Style Judicial Review? 85 TUL. L. REV. 1039, 1055–
56 (2011). 
146 For a more detailed analysis of the NOAA assessment regulation, see Charles B. 
Anderson, Damage to Natural Resources and the Costs of Restoration, 72 TUL. L. REV.  
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4. State Laws 
OPA does not preempt state legislation. States can still have their 
own liability legislation concerning oil pollution.147 In the United 
States, thirty of the fifty States have a coastline. All but six of these 
coast states have legislation on vessels liability.148 
States may have liability rules that diverge from OPA’s by 
allowing a broader definition of the responsible parties, higher 
liability limits, or even unlimited liability.149 For example, cargo 
owners are admitted as responsible parties explicitly in some states, 
such as Alaska, California, Maryland, and New Jersey.150 In some 
other states, cargo owners are also potentially liable; though they are 
not explicitly listed as responsible parties, the broad definition of 
responsible parties does not exclude cargo owners.151 
Some states impose strict and unlimited civil liability for cleanup 
costs, natural resource damages, and private losses caused by oil 
pollution, including pure economic losses, such as Alaska, California, 
North Carolina, and Rhode Island.152 In some other states, unlimited 
liability is only established for certain categories of damage, such as 
in Washington (for cleanup costs and damages to persons or 
property), Maryland (for cleanup costs, damage to real and personal 
property, and natural resource damages), Massachusetts (for natural 
resource damages), and Florida (for natural resource damages, 
damage to real and personal property, and losses consequential upon 
property damage).153 
A comprehensive discussion of the state oil pollution statutes is not 
within the scope of this Article. However, it is worth noting that the 
state statutes, in addition to OPA, make vessels coming into American 
 
417, 466–84 (1997); Letourneau & Welmaker, supra note 141, at 186–89; James S. 
Seevers, Note, NOAA’s New Natural Resource Damage Assessment Scheme: It’s Not 
About Collecting Money, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1513 (1996). 
147 Robert Force et al., Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages, Crimes, 
Civil Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TUL. L. REV. 889, 978–79 
(2011). 
148 Id. 
149 For a short summary of the states’ legislation, see COLIN DE LA RUE & CHARLES B. 
ANDERSON, SHIPPING AND THE ENVIRONMENT app. 3 at 1163–81 (2d ed. 2009) and Force 
et al., supra note 147. 
150 See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 149; Force et al., supra note 147. 
151 See supra note 150. 
152 Force et al., supra note, 147, at 979. 
153 Id. 
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ports face potentially unlimited liability.154 This is quite different than 
the international regime. Besides, some of the stricter state statutes 
often require a higher financial responsibility.155 Whether and to what 
extent the combination of unlimited liability and financial 
responsibility in states can contribute to better cost internalization and 
safer records also deserves more attention. 
C. Compensation Instruments 
1. Financial Responsibility 
Liability itself cannot guarantee cost internalization and 
compensation. To ensure the availability of compensation in case of 
damage, OPA requires potential responsible parties to establish and 
maintain evidence of financial responsibility up to a certain level.156 
To ensure the capacity of public authorities to remove pollution in 
case of damage and to provide further protection to victims, the Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund was established.157 
OPA requires some vessels and offshore facilities to provide 
evidence of financial responsibility. The responsible party for “(1) 
any vessel over 300 gross tons . . . using any place subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States; [and] (2) any vessel using the waters 
of the exclusive economic zone to transship or . . . oil destined for a 
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” is required to 
provided evidence of financial responsibility “sufficient to meet the 
maximum amount of liability” set in OPA.158 
The parties who are required to provide evidence of financial 
responsibility expanded to the responsible parties of “any tank vessel 
over 100 gross tons using any place subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States” under the Coast Guard Authorization Act in 2010.159 
 
154 In some states, vessels face unlimited liability according to state law. See id. 
155 See Inho Kim, A Comparison Between the International and US Regimes 
Regulating Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation, 27 MARINE POL’Y 263, Annex B 
(2003). 
156 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (2012). 
157 Lawrence Kiern, Liability, Compensation and Financial Responsibility under the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 481, 545 
(2000). 
158 33 U.S.C. § 2716(a)(1)–(3). 
159 Id. § 2716(a)(3) (codifying the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-281, 124 Stat. 2905 (2010)). 
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For the identified offshore facilities, different levels of financial 
responsibilities are required based on the type of facilities. For an 
offshore facility located seaward of the seaward boundary of a State, 
the level is set at $35 million.160 For an offshore facility located 
landward of the seaward boundary of a State, the level is set as $10 
million.161 The responsible party of a deepwater port is required to 
provide financial responsibility sufficient to meet its maximum 
liability established under OPA.162 
Potential responsible parties can use various methods to establish 
their financial responsibility, including the following: insurance, 
surety bond, guarantee, letter of credit, qualification as a self-insurer, 
or other evidence.163 As a guarantor under OPA, one has to accept the 
direct action by claimants.164 Further, “the guarantor may not invoke 
any other defense that might be available in proceedings brought by 
the responsible [parties] against the guarantor.”165 
If potential responsible parties can demonstrate the required 
financial responsibility, a certificate of financial responsibility 
(COFR) is issued. 166 Traditionally, insurance has been the most 
popularly used method to meet financial responsibility.167 Well before 
the promulgation of OPA, P&I Clubs were the primary providers of 
maritime liability insurance.168 Even though they remained insurance 
providers, they refused to act as guarantors under OPA.169 In addition 
to P&I Clubs, many other insurers and shipping industries have 
shown their concerns or criticisms towards OPA and the financial 
responsibility regulations issued by the Coast Guard.170 Major issues 
include potential unlimited liability under OPA and states’ statutes 
and the capacity of the reinsurance market and the possibility of a 
direct action against guarantors.171 The critics even predicted that 
 
160 Id. § 2716(c)(1)(B)(i). 
161 Id. § 2716(c)(1)(B)(ii). 
162 Id. § 2716(c)(2). 
163 Id. § 2716(e). 
164 Id. § 2716(f)(1). 
165 Id. § 2716(f)(1)(C). 
166 Inho Kim, Financial Responsibility Rules Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 42 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 565, 570 (2002). 
167 Id. at 571. 
168 See id. 
169 DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 149, at 57. 
170 Kiern, supra note 157, at 558–70. 
171 DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 149, at 56–58; Kiern, supra note 157, at 561–
62. 
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OPA of 1990 would result in the so-called “train-wreck” scenario, 
which refers to the withdrawal of most vessels from U.S. trade and 
the possibility of a related disruption in the U.S. economy.172 
In spite of the doubts, the “train wreck” never materialized. 
Though refusing to act as guarantors under the OPA, the P&I Clubs 
still provide oil pollution coverage in the United States at the price of 
additional premiums.173 Besides, several alternatives started to emerge 
as the “guarantors”—such as the Shoreline Mutual Insurance 
Association and the First Line and Arvak Ltd.—after the issue of the 
Coast Guard’s Interim Final Rule on Financial Responsibility.174 
Some larger tanker operators can also satisfy their responsibility 
through surety bond or self-insurance.175 Those instruments have been 
developed for the financial responsibility purpose under the invisible 
hand of the U.S. oil market.176 It is worth noting that those 
instruments are not designed to replace but to complement the P&I 
policies.177 Usually, their coverage requires membership in a P&I 
Club.178 The P&I Clubs remain to assume oil pollution costs in most 
cases, and only when the P&I Clubs fail to provide coverage will the 
risks fall within the scope of the new instruments.179 
In addition to the financial responsibility required by OPA, some 
state statutes also have provisions on financial responsibility. Some of 
the states require financial responsibility from parties other than the 
ones under OPA, such as owners of oil (California).180 Some states 
require a higher level of financial responsibility than the federal level, 
such as Alaska (for tank vessels and oil barges carrying crude oil, 
$400.20 for each barrel of storage capacity or $133,400,000, 
whichever is greater), California ($1 billion for owners and operators 
of tankers, large barges, and owners of oil), and Washington ($500 
 
172 See Financial Responsibility for Water Pollution (Vessels), 59 Fed. Reg. 34210, 
34225-26  (July 1, 1994); Import Disruption Possible if Pollution Liability Is Not 
Resolved, Hart’s Petromoney, Mar. 21, 1994, at 1 (cited by Lawrence Kiern, supra note 
157, at 566 n.625). 
173 Kim, supra note 166, at 578–79. 
174 Id. at 577. 
175 DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 149, at 61–63. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Kim, supra note 166, at 577, 581–82. 
180 DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 149. 
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million for a tank vessel that carries oil as cargo).181 To make it 
possible for potential responsible parties to meet their higher financial 
responsibility, some states allow the use of membership in a P&I Club 
as evidence of financial responsibility, such as Virginia and 
California.182 The California statute does not provide a right of direct 
action.183 Virginia lists the instruments that are subject to direct 
action, such as insurance, guaranty, or surety.184 Virginia does not 
require P&I Clubs to be subject to direct action.185 
2. Compensation Funds 
Though the COFR can ensure a certain extent of compensation, 
damage may remain uncompensated if the limit of the COFR or 
liability is exceeded. In response to an accident, the public authorities 
may need to take removals and make natural resources assessment 
and then seek the costs from liable parties. The prolonged claim 
procedure may influence the capacity of public authorities to make a 
prompt response. To fill in those gaps, the Oil Spill Liability Trust 
Fund (OSLTF) was established.186 
The Fund is available for the removal costs of the trustees 
consistent with the National Contingency Plan.187 These costs include 
the costs incurred by the trustees in assessing the natural resource 
damage and developing and implementing the restoration plans, 
removal costs incurred by other parties determined to be consistent 
with the National Contingency Plan, uncompensated removal costs 
and damages, and related administrative costs.188 Except under some 
limited situations, the claims should be presented to the responsible 
parties or their guarantors first.189 OPA limits payments by the 
OSLTF for removal costs and damages in each incident to $1 
billion.190 A sublimit for natural resource damages payments is set at 
$500 million per incident.191 The per incident limit for removal costs 
 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 60. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Kim, supra note 166, at 567. 
187 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a)(1) (2012). 
188 Id. § 2712(a)(1)–(5). 
189 Id. § 2713(a). 
190 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
191 Id. § 9509 (c)(2)(A)(ii). 
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and damages was increased to $2.7 billion under the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005.192 
The OSLTF is financed from several sources: a tax on crude oil 
transported to or produced in the United States, the transfers from the 
previously existing pollution funds, interest on the Fund principal 
from U.S. Treasury investments, and recovery of costs from 
responsible parties or their guarantors and penalties.193 The tax on oil 
is the major part of the fund, which was set as five cents per barrel 
initially for a five-year period.194 In 1994, the balance of the OSLTF 
reached $1 billion and the tax expired.195 The tax was reinstated by 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and increased by the Energy 
Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 to eight cents per barrel until 
2016 and nine cents per barrel in 2017.196 After paying removal costs 
and damages, the OSLTF can recover from responsible parties.197 
According to an implementing report by the OSLTF, the annual 
recovery from the financial year 2004 to 2008 fluctuates from $7 
million to $16 million, which means that sixteen percent of the 
OSLTF removal and claims expenditures were recovered.198 
IV 
COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE 
CAUSED BY MARINE OIL POLLUTION IN CHINA 
A. Scope of Compensable Damage and Quantification of Damage 
As mentioned earlier, marine oil pollution in China deserves a 
separate discussion since it is one of the few cases where the liability 
and compensation instruments for natural resource damage seem to be 
working adequately. This may be explained by the fact that some 
international conventions that China has joined oblige Member States 
to introduce a financial security (like compulsory insurance) to cover 
 
192 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 13211–13574). 
193 26 U.S.C. § 9509(b). 
194 NAT’L POLLUTION FUNDS CTR., U.S. COAST GUARD, OIL SPILL LIABILITY TRUST 
FUND (OSLTF) ANNUAL REPORT FY2004–FY2008 3 (2008), available at http://www 
.uscg.mil/npfc/docs/PDFs/Reports/OSLTF_Report_FY04-FY08.pdf. 
195 See id. at 2. 
196 Id. 
197 See id. at 3–4. 
198 Id. 
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the risks of marine pollution. Moreover, as we explained before, a 
long tradition of coverage via the so-called protection and indemnity 
clubs that oversee environmental pollution risks exists in the field of 
marine pollution. This also applies in China. 
In China, the Marine Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) is the 
basic law in the field of marine environmental protection and 
pollution prevention. Article 90 of the MEPA stipulates the liability 
for marine pollution: 
Whoever causes pollution damage to the marine environment shall 
remove the pollution and compensate the losses; in case of pollution 
damage to the marine environment resulting entirely from the 
intentional act or fault of a third party, that third party shall remove 
the pollution and be liable for the compensation.199 
In line with the EPA and the new Tort Liability Law (TLL), strict 
liability is established under MEPA. However, it does not further 
explain what constitutes “pollution damage.” 
The concept of pollution damage can, however, be interpreted 
taking into account the conventions that China has joined and the 
related judicial explanations. China is a party to the CLC, which 
means that the definition of pollution damage under the CLC also 
applies to China. However, in practice, there are still debates on the 
scope of application of the CLC. The CLC applies to “any sea-going 
vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or 
adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo.”200 The term “oil” is 
defined as “any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as crude oil, 
fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, and lubricating oil.”201 Thus, when the 
pollution involves other types of vessels or crafts, or the damage is 
caused by nonpersistent oil, the domestic Chinese law applies. 
However, even when the CLC ships and oil cause damage, there are 
still debates on whether the CLC applies only to ships with a foreign 
related issue or to all types of seagoing vessels and seaborne crafts.202 
 
199 Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China 
[Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Haiyang Huanjing Baohu Fa] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000), art. 90 
(China), available at http://www .mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071012_656329 
.htm. 
200 CLC of 1992, supra note 55, art. I(1). 
201 Id. art. I(5). 
202 See James Hu & Yang Bo, Application of Law in Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage Caused by Coastal Vessels in China, in PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION OF 
MARINE POLLUTION DAMAGE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE, CHINA AND THE US 
193, 193–205 (Michael Faure & James Hu eds., 2006); Michael Faure & Wang Hui,  
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How to interpret this notion of a “foreign related issue” is also 
important in determining the application of the CLC.203 
As far as domestic law is concerned, a judicial explanation issued 
by the Supreme Court in 2011 provides guidance to the judiciary inter 
alia on damage assessment in case of vessel-induced oil pollution.204 
This explanation applies to a “vessel-induced oil pollution incident 
[that] has caused or threatens to cause oil pollution damage to the 
territorial waters of the People’s Republic of China.”205 The term “oil 
pollution damage,” which is explained in a similar way to the CLC, 
covers 
1. Costs of preventive measures to prevent or minimize vessel-
induced oil pollution damage, and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures; 
2. Property damage caused outside the vessel carrying oil by the 
vessel-induced oil pollution incident, and loss of earnings caused 
therefrom; 
3. Loss of earnings caused by environmental damage resulting 
from oil pollution; and 
4. Costs of reasonable measures which have been taken or are 
about to be taken to restore the contaminated environment. 206 
Under this definition, two provisions are related to natural resource 
damage: prevention and restoration costs. To further clarify the scope 
of compensable pure environmental damage (ecological damage), the 
court’s explanation stipulates the following: 
If a vessel-induced oil pollution incident causes environmental 
damage, the compensation for environmental damage shall be 
limited to expenses on reasonable measures which have been taken 
 
Financial Caps for Oil Pollution Damage: China and the International Conventions, in 
PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION OF MARINE POLLUTION DAMAGE: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE, CHINA AND THE US, supra note 202, at 317, 329–30. 
203 For example, a foreign element may be that one party involved is a foreigner, the 
cause of the cases happens abroad, and the subject matter is located abroad. See Hu & Bo, 
supra note 202, at 198–99. 
204 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of 
Dispute over Compensation for Vessel-Induced Oil Pollution Damage [Zuigao Renmin 
Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Chuanbo Youwu Sunhai Peichang Anjian Ruogan Wenti De 
Guiding]  (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. of Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 10, 2011, 
effective July 1, 2011) (China). 
205 Id. art. 1. 
206 Id. art. 9. 
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or are about to be taken to restore the environment. Such expenses 
include reasonable expenses on monitoring, assessment and 
research.207 
Similarly to the CLC, the court adopts a cautious attitude to explain 
restoration costs: only the “reasonable” measures that “have been 
taken or are about to be taken” are considered compensable.208 
When compensation for natural resource damage is concerned, an 
unavoidable question arises as to how to quantify such damage. As 
discussed earlier, there are general rules to assessing natural resource 
damage in China. An unbinding recommendation on assessment 
methods is published, which gives guidance to the quantification of 
five types of damage: personal injury, property damage, emergency-
response costs, assessment costs, and restoration costs.209 When 
restoration is possible, the restoration costs refer to the actual costs 
that have taken place. If the restoration is unavailable, the 
recommendation allows assessment with a stimulated restoration 
method.210 In other words, the recommendation goes further than the 
2011 explanation. The latter allows compensation for restoration costs 
only when restoration has taken place or is about to occur. However, 
under the recommendation, compensation is possible even if 
restoration is not possible. It is worth noting that the recommendation 
is not a binding document. 
In the field of water pollution, there are indeed two standards 
guiding the quantification of fishery losses: the 1996 Rules on 
Calculating Fishery Losses Caused by Water Pollution Accidents211 
and the 2008 Calculation Methods for Economic Losses Caused by 
Fishery Pollution Accidents.212 The 1996 rules apply both to the 
calculation of direct economic losses suffered by individuals and 
 
207 Id. art. 17. 
208 Id. art. 9. 
209 Recommendation on Methods of Assessing Environmental Damage [Huanjing 
Wuran Sunhai Shue Jisuan Tuijian Fangfa] (promulgated by the Ministry of Envtl. Prot., 
May 25, 2011, effective May 25, 2011) (developed by the Chinese Academy for 
Environmental Planning) (China). 
210 Id. § 4.5. 
211 The Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses Caused by Water Pollution Accidents 
[Shuiyu Wuran Shigu Yuye Sunshi Jisuan Fangfa Guiding] (promulgated by the Ministry 
of Fishery, effective Oct. 8, 1996) (China). 
212 Calculation Methods for Economic Losses Caused by Fishery Pollution Accidents 
[Yuye Wuran Shigu Jingji Sunshi Jisuan Fangfa] (promulgated by the General Admin. of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and Standardization Admin., effective 
June 1, 2008) (China). 
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natural fishery resources that are not owned by private parties.213 The 
2008 standards further clarify the methods to assess natural fishery 
losses.214 Together, these two documents provide practical guidance 
to assessing one type of natural resource damage: natural fishery 
losses. However, for the other types of damage, the assessment 
standards are still lacking. 
As far as marine environmental liability is concerned, there are 
several other issues worth mentioning. As discussed above, strict 
liability is the rule for oil spills. MEPA allows three types of 
defenses: damage caused by war, natural calamities, and negligence 
or other wrongful acts in exercise of functions of competent 
departments responsible for the maintenance of beacons or other 
navigational aids.215 MEPA is silent on how to determine liability if 
damage is caused by multiple tortfeasors. One new characteristic of 
the TLL of 2009 is that the multiple tortfeasors are severally liable for 
the environmental damage they caused.216 In line with this provision, 
the 2011 explanation also introduces joint and several liability as the 
primary form of liability to deal with the multiple tortfeasor issue: 
When oil has escaped from two or more vessels, and pollution 
damage results therefrom, if the party who suffers the damage 
requests that the owners of all vessels involved undertake the 
liability for compensation, the owners of all vessels involved shall 
undertake their respective liability for compensation if the damage 
is reasonably separable according to the quantity of oil leaked, the 
harm caused by their oil and other relevant factors; if the damage is 
 
213 The Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses Caused by Water Pollution Accidents § 2. 
214 Calculation Methods for Economic Losses Caused by Fishery Pollution Accidents § 
4. 
215 Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China 
[Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Haiyang Huanjing Baohu Fa] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000), art. 92 
(China), available at http://www .mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071012_656329  
.htm. 
216 Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhongua Renmin Zongghe 
Guo Qinquan Zeren Fa] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 
26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), art. 67 (China), available at http://www.procedural 
law.cn/english/law/201001/t20100110_300173.html (“Where the environmental pollution 
is caused by two or more polluters, the seriousness of liability of each polluter shall be 
determined according to the type of pollutant, volume of emission and other factors.”). 
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not reasonably separable, the owners of all vessels involved shall be 
jointly and severally liable, unless exonerated by law.217 
The earlier sections show that in both the United States and the 
international regimes, liability for oil pollution is capped (with an 
exception for offshore facilities, minus deepwater ports under OPA, 
for which removal cost liability is unlimited).218 In China, neither the 
TLL nor MEPA touch upon the liability cap. However, the China 
Maritime Code (CMC) allows the liable party to limit its maritime 
liability.219 It is worth noting that the categories of claims that are 
subject to the limit under the CMC are much broader than oil 
pollution under MEPA.220  Since China is a member-state of the CLC, 
which established a separate liability limit for oil pollution, the limits 
set in the CMC do not apply to claims for oil pollution under the 
CLC.221 As mentioned earlier, there are debates on the application 
 
217 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of 
Dispute over Compensation for Vessel-Induced Oil Pollution Damage [Zuigao Renmin 
Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Chuanbo Youwu Sunhai Peichang Anjian Ruogan Wenti De 
Guiding] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. of Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 10, 2011, 
effective July 1, 2011), art. 3 (China). 
218 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2012). 
219 Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Haishang Fa] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Congress, Nov. 
7, 1992, effective July 1, 1993), art. 207 (China), available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn 
/legis/cen/laws/mcotproc360/. 
220 The limit under the CMC is established for the following: 
(1) Claims in respect of loss of life or personal injury or loss of or damage to 
property including damage to harbour works, basins and waterways and aids to 
navigation occurring on board or in direct connection with the operation of the ship 
or with salvage operations, as well as consequential damages resulting therefrom; 
(2) Claims in respect of loss resulting from delay in delivery in the carriage of 
goods by sea or from delay in the arrival of passengers or their luggage; 
(3) Claims in respect of other loss resulting from infringement of rights other than 
contractual rights occurring in direct connection with the operation of the ship or 
salvage operations; 
(4) Claims of a person other than the person liable in respect of measures taken to 
avert or minimize loss for which the person liable may limit his liability in 
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, and further loss caused by such 
measures. 
 All the claims set out in the preceding paragraph, whatever the way they are 
lodged, may be entitled to limitation of liability. However, with respect to the 
remuneration set out in sub-paragraph (4) for which the person liable pays as 
agreed upon in the contract, in relation to the obligation for payment, the person 
liable may not invoke the provisions on limitation of liability of this Article. 
Id. 
221 Id. art. 208(2). 
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scope of the CLC in both academia and in case law.222 This debate 
also puzzles the determination of the limit for oil pollution. To clarify 
this issue, the Regulation on the Prevention and Control of Vessel-
Induced Marine Environment Pollution of 2009 stipulates the 
following: 
With regard to the limitation of liability for pollution damage 
caused by vessels, provisions of Maritime Code of the People’s 
Republic of China in respect of the limitation of liability for 
maritime claims shall apply. However, with regard to the 
limitation of liability for pollution damage caused by vessels 
carrying persistent oils in bulk to sea areas under the jurisdiction 
of the People’s Republic of China, the provisions of the 
international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People’s 
Republic of China shall apply.223 
According to this provision, the CLC will apply as long as vessels 
carrying persistent oil cause the damage. Hence, it seems that the 
foreign-related issue is no longer necessary for the application of the 
CLC. If the damage is caused by an accident which does not fall into 
the scope of the CLC, such as damage caused by non-persistent fuel 
oil or fuel oil carried by vessels rather than by oil tankers, the limits 
under the CMC will apply. 
B. Standing 
To bring a claim for natural resource damage, one major obstacle 
in the Chinese legal system is who has the locus standi. According to 
the Civil Procedure Law, only the party who has “a direct interest in 
the case” can bring a lawsuit.224 However, when there is only damage 
to natural resources, especially publicly-owned natural resources,  
 
222 See supra note 202. For a different interpretation of the application scope in case 
law, see Zhang Liying, Compensation for the Domestic Oil Pollution in China’s Coast: 
Which Law Shall Apply?, in MARITIME POLLUTION LIABILITY AND POLICY: CHINA, 
EUROPE AND THE US 359, 360–69 (Michael G. Faure et al. eds., 2010). 
223 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Vessel-Induced Marine Environment Pollution [Fangzhi Chuanbo Wuran Haiyang Guanli 
Tiaoli] (promulgated by the St. Council, Sept. 2, 2009, effective Mar. 1, 2010), art. 52 
(China), available at http://dinrac.nowpap.org/documents/law/China/Regulations_on 
_Prevention_Control_of_Vessel-induced_Marine_Environment_Pollution_China.pdf. 
224 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Minshi Susongfa] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, 
effective Apr. 9, 1991), art. 108 (China), available at http://www.china.org.cn/english 
/government/207343.htm. 
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determining the party who has standing to claim damages remains a 
difficult issue. This obstacle has made it difficult to develop 
environmental public interest litigation in China.225 However, this is 
less of a problem in the case of marine pollution. MEPA explicitly 
authorizes public authorities to sue for marine pollution damage: 
For damages to marine ecosystems, marine fishery resources and 
marine protected areas which cause heavy losses to the State, the 
department invested with power by the provisions of this law to 
conduct marine environment supervision and administration shall, 
on behalf of the State, put forward [a] compensation demand to 
those held responsible for the damages.226 
In China, many natural resources are owned by the state. This 
provision authorizes the competent public authorities to represent the 
state in a suit for compensation. The competent public authorities are 
 
225 The claims for the pollution of the Songhua River by PetroChina in 2005 provide an 
example. An explosion occurred on November 13, 2005, at a petrochemical plant owned 
by PetroChina Cooperation due to an operational fault. See Wang Jin et al., Reflections 
from the Transboundary Pollution of Songhua River, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 273, 273 (Michael Faure & Song Ying eds., 2008). This 
explosion, and the emergency measures which were subsequently taken, led to a large spill 
of toxic substances into the Songhua River. Id. This led to a temporary stop in water 
supply for Harbin city, id., and resulted in direct economic losses of up to 1.5 billion RMB 
(0.238 billion USD) in that city alone. Wang Canfa et al., Pondering over the Incident of 
Songhua River Pollution from the Perspective of Environmental Law, in CHINA AND 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY, supra note 225, at 291. Apart from direct 
economic loss, this incident led to significant ecological losses as well. For an overview of 
the impact of the Songhua River pollution, see U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE SONGHUA 
RIVER SPILL CHINA–FIELD MISSION REPORT (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.unep 
.org/PDF/China_Songhua_River_Spill_draft_7_301205.pdf. However, the constrained 
standing provision in the Civil Procedure Law created a challenge for claims regarding 
such loss. According to the Civil Procedural Law, the plaintiff should be the party who has 
direct interest involved in the case. Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, art. 108 (1). However, for ecological damage that concerns only the general public 
but no individuals, obstacles exist when the individual tries to make a claim on behalf of 
the environment. After this toxic waste spill, some experts filed a civil public interest 
lawsuit, including nature as a joint-plaintiff, with the High People’s Court of Heilongjiang. 
Jin et al., supra note 225, at 275. However, nature has no standing according to Chinese 
law and the experts suffered no direct loss; hence, the case was not accepted by the court. 
The Peking University teacher and five students sued PetroChina on behalf of the Songhua 
River for 10 billion RMB, but the Court didn’t accept the case. See Alex Wang, The Role 
of Law in Environmental Protection in China: Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 
195, at 205 (2007). 
226 Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China 
[Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Haiyang Huanjing Baohu Fa] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000), art. 90 
(China), available at http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071012_656329 
.htm. 
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limited to “the department invested with power by the provisions of 
this law to conduct marine environmental supervision and 
administration.”227 According to MEPA, there are four main types of 
public authorities involved: environmental protection agencies, ocean 
agencies, marine safety agencies, and fishery administrations.228 The 
environmental protection agencies are responsible for protecting the 
ocean from land-based pollutants and coastal construction projects; 
the ocean agencies are responsible for the supervision and 
administration of the marine environment, preventing pollution 
caused by marine construction projects, and preventing waste from 
being dumped into the sea; the marine safety agencies are in charge of 
marine environmental protection in port waters and the investigation 
of pollution accidents; and the fishery administrations  are responsible 
for pollution inside fishing port waters and protecting the ecological 
environment in fishing zones.229 The latter three parties play a major 
role in suing for marine natural resource damage. 
When a vessel accident leads to marine pollution, the marine safety 
agency “shall have the right to adopt forcible measures to avoid or 
reduce pollution damage.”230 In other words, the marine safety agency 
is responsible for the prevention measures and cleanup in case of an 
accident and can claim such costs later. Usually, it is easier for the 
marine safety agency to claim back costs rather than other agencies 
because cleanup costs and losses by cleanup measures can usually be 
calculated relatively easily and public authorities can arrest the vessel 
as security for the costs of cleanup and preventive measures.231 In 
addition to such measures, if an accident leads to other environmental 
losses, such as lost ecological capacity, the Oceanic Agency can make 
a claim for the damage.232 The fishery administration is the party who 
can make a claim for lost natural fishery resources. 
 
227 Id. 
228 Id. art. 5. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. art. 71. 
231 See Special Maritime Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua 
Renmin Guoheguo Haishi Susong Tebie Chengxu Fa]  (promulgated by Standing Comm. 
of Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1999, effective July 1, 2000), art. 21 (China), available 
at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383565.htm. 
232 Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China 
[Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Haiyang Huanjing Baohu Fa] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000), art. 90  
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The authorization of public authorities is not only a theoretical 
possibility but is also used in practice. Compensation for damage 
caused by the ship Tasman Sea is an example. In 2003, the Tasman 
Sea crashed near Tianjin which led to an oil leak.233 The release of oil 
led to serious damage to the fishing industry and to the marine 
environment.234 The Tianjin Oceanic Agency and Fishery Agency 
brought claims against the transporter shortly after the accident.235 
The Oceanic Agency sued for the loss of oceanic environmental 
capacity, loss of marine biodiversity, restoration costs, and 
assessment costs.236 The Fishery Agency sued for natural fishery 
losses.237 In the first judgment in 2004, the defendants were required 
to pay the Oceanic Agency for the loss of environmental capacity and 
assessment costs of nearly RMB 10 million (USD 1.59 million), and 
pay the Fishery Agency more than RMB 15 million (USD 2.38 
million) for natural fishery losses.238 This was reported as the first 
case in China that the Oceanic Agency claimed marine natural 
resource damages involving foreign interests.239 
 
(China), available at http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071012_656329. 
htm (“[F]or [pollution] damages to marine ecosystems, marine fishery resources and 
marine protected areas which cause heavy losses to the State, the [Oceanic Agency] . . . 
shall, on behalf of the State, put forward [a] compensation demand to those held 
responsible for the damages.”). 
233 Dan Liu, Revisiting China’s Legislation on Compensation for Marine Ecological 
Damages: Lessons Learned from 2011 Penglai 19-3 Oil Spill, Presentation at the 
International Forum on Shipping, Ports and Airports (June 2013) (transcript available at 
http://www.hksoa.org/contents/attachments/Presentations/2013/IFSPA2013/Papers/M14 
.pdf). 
234 Xiaoqin Zhu & Lin Dong, Legal Remedies for Marine Ecological Damage in 
China: As Illustrated by the Tasman Sea Oil Spills Case, 2 J. E. ASIA & INT’L L. 391, 394 
(2009). 
235 Zhu Xiao, Zhongguo Haiyang Shengtai Sunhai Suopei Diyian [The First Claim for 
Marine Ecological Damage in China] 2006 GREEN LEAF 50, 50 (China). 
236 Hui Ji, Tasman Yiyou Suopeian Panpei 4200wan [42 million RMB was Awarded as 
Damages for Tasman Sea Oil Spill] 26 JIAOTONGHUANBAO 28, 28 (2005) (China). 
237 Id. 
238 Zhu & Dong, supra note 234, at 394–95. 
239 Id. at 394; see also Ma Jing Jing & Du Jiang, Discussion on the National Claim 
System for Oil Pollution Damage from Ships, in PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION OF 
MARINE POLLUTION DAMAGE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE, CHINA AND THE US, 
supra note 202, at 223–24, 231 (noting that this case has been appealed by the defendant 
to the High Court of Tianjin and the final judgment is not made public yet); ZHU XIAO, A 
STUDY OF SOCIALIZED INDEMNIFICATION FOR ECOLOGICAL DAMAGE: A 
JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE 28–30 (2007) (China). 
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C. Mandatory Financial Security 
As noted, China is a member-state of the CLC, which introduces an 
obligation for shipowners to seek insurance coverage for potential 
liability under the Convention. Influenced by the CLC, MEPA of 
1999 requires vessels to carry oil pollution liability insurance and oil 
funds, and MEPA also authorizes the State Council to promulgate 
concrete rules on those issues.240 However, concrete rules were only 
issued in 2009 through the Regulation on Vessel-Induced Pollution.241 
The Regulation requires the vessels navigating Chinese seas (with the 
exception of vessels with carrying capacities of less than one 
thousand tons carrying cargo other than oil) to buy insurance or to 
seek other financial security coverage.242 The amount of financial 
security required shall be no less than the amount required under the 
CMC and the conventions China acceded to.243 To implement this 
provision, another document was published in 2010 to further clarify 
the types of vessels that are subject to the compulsory financial 
security requirement and the amount of the required security.244 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
240 Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China 
[Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Haiyang Huanjing Baohu Fa]  (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000), art. 66 
(China), available at http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071012_656329. 
htm.http://www.mlr .gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071012_656329.htm. 
241 See Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Vessel-Induced Marine Environment Pollution [Zhonghua Remin Guoheguo Fangzhi 
Chuanbo Wuran Haiyang Huanjing Guanli Tiaoli] (promulgated by the St. Council, Sept. 
2, 2009, effective Mar. 1, 2010) (China), available at http://dinrac.nowpap.org 
/documents/law/China/Regulations_on_Prevention_Control_of_Vessel-induced_Marine 
_Environment_Pollution _China.pdf. 
242 Id. art. 53. 
243 Id. 
244 Measures of the People’s Republic of China for the Implementation of Civil 
Liability Insurance for Vessel-Induced Oil Pollution Damage [Zhonghua Renmin 
Guoheguo Chuanbo Youwu Sunhai Minshi Zeren Baoxian Shishi Banfa] (promulgated by 
the Ministry of Transport, Aug. 19, 2010, effective Oct. 1, 2010) (China), available at 
faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/chn106 766E.doc. 
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Table 4: The Types of Vessels and Required Financial Security245 
Vessels with persistent oil as cargo 
Vessels with non-persistent oil as 
cargo and non-oil tankers larger 
than 1000 tons (gross tonnage) 
Types of vessels 
(gross tonnage) 
Amount of 
financial security 
Types of vessels 
(gross tonnage) 
Amount of 
financial 
security 
(1) Lower than 
5,000 tons 
4.51 million SDR 
(6.93 million USD) 
(1) 20-21 tons 
(not including 
21)  
27,500 SDR 
(42,265.3 
USD) 
(2) 21-300 tons 
(not including 
300) 
(1) +500 SDR 
(768.46 USD) 
per ton 
(2) Higher than 
5,000 tons 
(1) +631 SDR 
(969.8 USD) per 
ton; but the total 
amount is no more 
than 89.77 million 
SDR (137.97 
USD) 
(3) 300-500 tons 167,000 SDR 
(256,665.64 
USD) 
(4) 501-30,000 
tons 
(3) +167 SDR 
(256.67 USD) 
per ton  
(5) 30,001-
70,000 tons 
(4) +125 SDR 
(192.12 USD) 
per ton 
(6) Above 70,001 
tons 
(5) +83 SDR 
(127.56 USD) 
per ton 
The Implementation Rules require that Chinese vessels either buy 
insurance from insurers authorized by the Marine Safety Agency or 
acquire other financial security, such as a letter of guarantee or a letter 
of credit from insurers or other financial institutions determined by 
the Marine Safety Agency.246 The requirements for commercial 
insurance companies and P&I Clubs to be determined as qualified are 
also clarified in the Implementation Rules.247 In 2012, twenty-three 
insurance companies and P&I Clubs have been acknowledged by the 
Marine Safety Agency, including the China Shipowners Mutual 
Assurance Association (CSMAA) (which is basically the China P&I 
Club), commercial insurers, and some members of the International 
Group of Protection & Indemnity Clubs (IG Group).248 
 
245 Id. arts. 5–6. 
246 Id. art. 8. 
247 Id. arts. 9–10. 
248 CHINA MAR. SAFETY ADMIN., GUANYU GONGBU 2012 NIANDU ZHONGGUOJI 
CHUANBO YOUWU SUNHAI MINSHI ZEREN BAOXIAN JIGOU MINGDANDE TONGZHI 
[NOTICE ON THE LIST OF INSURANCE COMPANIES PROVIDING OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE 
LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR CHINESE VESSELS OF 2012] (Dec. 19, 2011) (China). 
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CSMAA is one of the leading P&I Clubs in the Asia-Pacific 
region, providing coverage for various kinds of third-party liability, 
including oil pollution. This is a so-called P&I Club, composed of 
shipowners that adopt a risk-sharing agreement and, in that way, 
mutually cover each other’s losses.249 The CSMAA, as a P&I Club, 
formally functions as a risk-sharing agreement and not as an insurer, 
in the sense that risks are mutually shared and not shifted to a third 
party.250 However, from the victim’s perspective the crucial point is 
that P&I Clubs compensate the losses for which the members (usually 
shipowners) are covered.251 It is worth noting that the CSMAA is not 
a member of the IG Group.252 
Rule 3, section 12 of the CSMAA clearly provides that pollution 
risks are covered. According to this clause, the following risks are 
included: 
A. Liability for loss, damage or contamination. 
B. Any loss, damage or expense which the Member incurs, or for 
which he is liable, as a party to any agreement approved by the 
Directors, including the costs and expenses incurred by the member 
in performing his obligations under such agreements. 
C. The costs of any measures reasonably taken for the purpose of 
avoiding or minimizing pollution or any resulting loss or damage 
together with any liability for loss of or damage to property caused 
by measures so taken. 
D. The costs of any measures reasonabl[y] taken to prevent an 
imminent danger of the discharge or escape from the entered ship of 
oil or any substance which may cause pollution. 
 
249 See Bye-Laws, CHINA SHIPOWNERS MUTUAL ASSURANCE ASS’N, art. II(25) (June 
29, 2006), http://www.cpiweb.org/en_baoxiantiaokuan/bye.jsp (follow the “generality” 
hyperlink on the left subtitle bar); see also Coghlin, supra note 93. 
250 The CSMAA is the Chinese version of P&I Club, which means it has also the same 
characteristics as the P&I Club—being a risk sharing pool rather than commercial 
insurance. See FAURE & HARTLIEF, supra note 41, at 167–68 (noting the differences 
between risk sharing and insurance). 
251 One important line of the CSMAA’s policies is the liability insurance, which covers 
damage to cargo, personal injury, pollution damage and so on. So from the perspective of 
the shipowner, though the ships are insured by the groups of ships themselves but not 
commercial insurers, his or her damage can still be covered. 
252 ARTHUR GALLAGHER, MARINE P &I COMMERCIAL MARKET REVIEW 2013, at 46 
(2013), available at http://www.ajginternational.com/assets/Marine-PI-Newsletters 
/Marine-PI-Commercial-Market-2013-09.09.13.pdf. 
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E. The costs of liabilities incurred as a result of compliance with 
any order or direction given by any government or authority, for the 
purpose of preventing or reducing pollution or the risk of pollution, 
provided always that: 
a. such compliance is not a requirement for the normal operation or 
salvage or repair of the entered ship; and 
b. such costs or liabilities are not recoverable under the Hull 
Policies or the Hull Certificates of the entered ship.253 
This rule contains no specific title concerning restoration costs. 
These may, however, be partially covered under the title of cleanup 
costs. Cleanup costs need to be reasonable and actual.254 Interim 
losses are, according to the CSMAA, difficult to evaluate and are 
usually not compensated.255 
The CSMAA has an acceptance policy whereby a ship needs to be 
inspected before it is first covered.256 A classification society is 
designated to undertake the inspection.257 When the CSMAA is of the 
opinion that the ship is not qualified, it can either ask for 
improvement of safety measures or otherwise decide to refuse to 
cover.258 Refusal of coverage means, as a consequence, that the 
shipowner will have to try to seek coverage from another P&I Club or 
insurer since financial security coverage is mandatory.259 After the 
ship has been accepted, insurers conduct random inspections on the 
basis of the presumed quality properties of the ship and its age.260 A 
risk differentiation is applied.261 The differences in premiums are 
usually based on technical differences between the ships and also on 
the past loss experience.262 In the case of a heavy claim record, the 
contribution of the ship will be increased.263 Evaluation of risks takes 
 
253 See The Rules, CHINA SHIPOWNERS MUTUAL ASSURANCE ASS’N, rule 3, sec. 
12(d)(A)–(E) (May 29, 2011), http://www.cpiweb.org/en_baoxiantiaokuan/1_1.jsp (follow 
the “Protection and Indemnity Risks Covered” hyperlink on the left subtitle bar, then 
follow the “9” hyperlink at the bottom of the page). 
254 Interview with representatives of the CSMAA, in Beijing, China (Aug. 22, 2011) 
(interview transcript on file with the authors). 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. For the importance of risk differentiation, see Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard 
and Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541 (1979). 
262 Interview with representatives of the CSMAA, supra note 254. 
263 Id. 
JING (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2014  11:52 AM 
2014] Compensating for Natural Resource Damage Caused by 171 
Vessel-Induced Marine Oil Pollution: Comparing 
the International, U.S., and China Regimes 
place on the basis of the entire fleet of a shipowner rather than on the 
basis of one individual ship.264 The CSMAA is the party providing 
coverage to the ship, but above the amount of the so-called retention, 
it will purchase reinsurance from the international group of P&I 
Clubs.265 Reinsurance is purchased on a yearly basis. 
D. Compensation Funds 
Although China acceded to the CLC in 1980, it is not a member-
state of the IOPCF of 1971 and 1992.266 Hence, it is not obligatory for 
the Chinese oil industry to contribute to the Oil Pollution Fund.267 
However, the Regulation on Vessel-Induced Pollution requires the 
establishment of a domestic Vessel-Induced Oil Pollution Damage 
Compensation Fund (Compensation Fund).268 According to the 
regulation, all the cargo owners or their agents who receive persistent 
oil cargo carried by sea within maritime areas of China shall 
contribute to the Compensation Fund.269 The concrete rules to manage 
the fund were published recently.270 
The Regulation on the Compensation Fund fixed the contribution 
at RMB 0.3 (USD 0.048) per ton of persistent oil.271 The fund can be 
 
264 Id. 
265 Id.; see Michael Faure & Roger Van Den Bergh, Competition on the European 
Market for Liability Insurance and Efficient Accident Law, 9 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & 
COMP. L. 279, 279–306 (2002) (concerning the functioning of the international group of 
P&I Clubs). 
266 See IMO, supra note 66, at 242, 274–81, 288–95. 
267 According to the 1992 Fund Convention, the contracting states need to ensure the 
annual contributions to the Fund. International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage art. X, Nov. 27, 1992, 
[hereinafter 1992 Fund Convention], reprinted in INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION 
FUNDS, supra note 55, at 21–39. China is not a party of this Convention; hence, such an 
obligation does not exist. 
268 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Vessel-Induced Marine Environment Pollution [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fangzhi 
Chuanbo Wuran Haiyang Guanli Tiaoli] (promulgated by the St. Council, Sept. 2, 2009, 
effective Mar. 1, 2010), art. 56 (China), available at http://dinrac.nowpap.org 
/documents/law/China/Regulations_on_Prevention_Control_of_Vesselinduced_Marine 
_Environment _Pollution_China.pdf. 
269 Id. 
270 Management Regulation of Collection and Use of the Vessel-Induced Pollution 
Damage Compensation Fund [Caizhengbu Jiaotong Yunshubu Guanyu Yinfa Chuanbo 
Youwu Sunhai Peichang Jijin Zhengshou Shiyong Guanli Banfade Tongzhi] (promulgated 
by Ministry of Finance & Ministry of Transport, effective July 1, 2012) (China). 
271 Id. art. 6. 
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used to compensate or indemnify when (1) the total amount of 
compensation exceeds the shipowner’s limitation of liability; (2) legal 
defenses are available; (3) the shipowner and its insurer/guarantor 
cannot provide full compensation; and (4) the liable ship cannot be 
identified.272 Three exceptions are stipulated when the Compensation 
Fund does not apply: when the damage is caused by wars, 
insurrections, or non-commercial vessels/military ships held by the 
government; when claimants cannot prove that the oil pollution is 
caused by ships; or when the damage is fully or partially caused by 
the victims’ fault.273 
One major difference between the Chinese Compensation Fund 
and the IOPCF is that the former establishes priority lists to provide 
compensation in case of insufficient capacity of the fund. On the one 
hand, for the claims caused by different accidents, the Compensation 
Fund shall deal with the compensation according to the moment of 
application to the fund.274 On the other hand, if the claims are caused 
by the same accident, the compensation shall be provided according 
to the following order: emergency response costs, cleanup costs, 
direct economic losses suffered by fishery and tourism industries, the 
costs of measures to restore the marine ecosystem and natural fishery 
resources, monitoring costs incurred by the management committee 
of the Compensation Funds, and finally other costs approved by the 
State Council.275 The upper limit of compensation by the fund for one 
accident is set as RMB 30 million (4.77 million USD).276 
V 
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL, U.S., AND CHINESE 
SYSTEM 
After having described the compensation for natural resource 
damage caused by vessel-induced marine oil pollution in the 
international regime, the United States, and China, we will now 
critically compare the three regimes, first focusing on the basis of 
liability, then turning to the liable parties, and the available amount of 
compensation. This also requires a comparison of the requirement of 
financial security and the available compensation funds. The crucial 
 
272 Id. art. 15. 
273 Id. art. 16. 
274 Id. art. 17. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. art. 18. 
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question is to what extent natural resource damage is compensated in 
the systems examined. 
A. Basis of Liability 
In all three regimes, a strict liability system is chosen as the basis 
for the compensation of pollution damage, including the 
compensation for natural resource damage. This complies with the 
economic findings on tort law, which hold that a finding of liability 
will provide incentives for the potential parties to take preventive 
measures,277 and minimize the social costs of accidents by deterring 
the potential injurer from doing harm to the potential victims.278 In the 
case of a bilateral accident where both parties can influence the 
accident risk (like the case of a marine oil pollution incident), only 
strict liability is optimal in the sense that both negligence and strict 
liability can lead to an efficient care level, but only strict liability 
leads to an efficient activity level of the injurer as well.279 Moreover, 
marine oil pollution is clearly a case where the influence of the injurer 
(tanker owner) on the accident risk is surely more important than the 
victim’s. The party who transports oil, and hence discharges or poses 
risks to discharge oil into the sea—for example, a tanker owner—has 
a greater influence on the accident risk than the potential victims. 
Therefore, it is more important to control the behavior of the injurer 
than the victim, and imposing strict liability on the shipowner is 
justified.280 
On the other hand, the victims may have an influence on the 
accident risks as well (although their influence is usually less 
 
277 See Alberto Monti, Environmental Risk: A Comparative Law and Economics 
Approach to Liability and Insurance, 9 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 51 (2001) (discussing the 
role of liability rules as “engineering instruments”). 
278 The deterrent effect and victim protection functions of tort law have been widely 
discussed in law and economics literature. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of 
Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) 
(showing that the tort rules may serve both the aims of deterrence and corrective justice). 
279 See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). 
For a summary, see Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Andreas Schönenberger, Strict Liability Versus 
Negligence, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS 
597 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
280 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 188–89 
(2004). 
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compared with that of the injurer).281 They should also be given 
incentives to take precautions; this is often realized by adding a 
comparative or contributory negligence defense to the strict liability 
rule. Both the CLC of 1992 and OPA provide that if the pollution 
resulted wholly or partially from a negligent or intentional act or 
omission of the victim, the tanker owner will be exonerated wholly or 
partially from liability.282 Hence, a comparative negligence defense is 
added to the strict liability rule to provide the victim incentives to take 
care as well. As we indicated above, in China a strict liability rule 
applies on the basis of MEPA.283 This excludes liability in case of an 
intentional act or fault of a third party. Also Article 26 of the TTL 
explicitly provides that “[w]here the victim of a tort is also at fault as 
to the occurrence of harm, the liability of the tortfeasor may be 
mitigated.”284 
However, strict liability may be optimal only when the injurer is 
solvent. If the amount of damage exceeds the injurer’s wealth, as is 
often the case for oil pollution damage, the injurer will consider the 
risk as one where he could at most lose his assets and will set his care 
level according to the amount of his assets, which is lower than the 
optimal care level required by the actual damage he could cause. 
Thus, the insolvency risk may lead to underdeterrence.285 If the injurer 
were judgment-proof,286 a regulatory solution has to take care of the 
danger of underdeterrence resulting from insolvency.287 This will be 
further discussed in the section related to financial security.288 
 
281 Victims in oil pollution cases can usually not contribute to the prevention of the 
accident itself, but they can take measures to mitigate the damage after the accident 
occurred. 
282 33 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2012); CLC of 1992, supra note 55, art. III(3). 
283 See supra Part IV.A. 
284 Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhongua Renmin Zongghe 
Guo Qinquan Zeren Fa] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 
26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), art. 26 (China), available at http://www.procedural 
law.cn/english/law /201001/t20100110_300173.html. 
285 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for 
Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (1984) (explaining the 
underdeterrence effects of strict liability). 
286 A party is said to be judgment-proof if he avoids the full degree of liability he 
should rightly face. See Rohan Pitchford, Judgment-Proofness, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 380, 380–83 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
287 See also Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 
(1986). 
288 See infra Part V.D. 
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B. Liable Parties 
The question of who can be held liable for vessel-induced marine 
pollution is related on the one hand to the question of whether liability 
is exclusively channeled to the tanker owner, as well as to the 
question of whether there can be joint and several liability if more 
than one party contributed to the accident risk. Both issues will be 
discussed in turn. 
1. Channeling 
One major difference between the international and U.S. regimes is 
that the CLC exclusively channels the liability to the shipowner,289 
while OPA imposes joint and several liability on various parties 
including the tanker owner, operator, and bareboat charterer.290 China 
is a contracting country to the CLC. Although there is no specific 
provision in Chinese law excluding the liability of other parties like in 
the CLC, in practice, it is always the shipowner that is held liable in 
the case of marine oil pollution.291 
Channeling means that the convention or statute indicates which of 
many possible parties can be held liable for the loss, including the 
damage to natural resources. The liability of other potentially liable 
parties is excluded.292 In the oil pollution case, the liability of the 
tanker owner (to which liability is channeled) is limited to a certain 
amount, and the effect of the combination of a financial cap with 
channeling is that the victim can exclusively sue the tanker owner, 
where he is confronted with a financial cap.293 The victim has no 
additional possibility to bring another law suit if, as a result of the 
cap, his damages were not fully compensated.294 A suit based on tort 
law against the tanker owner for the amount not covered by the cap is 
 
289 CLC of 1992, supra note 55, art. II(1)–(2). 
290 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012); see also Albert Verheij, supra note 113, at 175. 
291 WANG HUI, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR MARINE OIL POLLUTION 249 (2011). 
292 For a discussion on the channeling of liability, see Michael Faure & Wang Hui, 
Economic Analysis of Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 37 J. MAR. LAW & COM. 
179, 187–88 (2006). 
293 Id. at 206–07. 
294 When there is channeling of liability, the victims cannot claim against other parties 
for their losses. This is the case in the CLC of 1992, which excludes the possibility for 
victims to claim against a list of parties. CLC of 1992, supra note 55, art. III(4). 
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excluded in the convention, and a suit against a third liable party is 
usually excluded as well because of the channeling.295 
On the other hand, channeling may have the advantage of 
transaction-cost reduction. Since the victim does not have to 
investigate who precisely the liable injurer is, he can only sue the 
shipowner to whom liability is channeled.296 However, this seems 
hardly valid: the additional benefit of channeling for the victim is 
limited (the costs of finding out the registered tanker owner who may 
be primarily liable are not that high), whereas the disadvantages for 
the victim are huge (he or she no longer has the possibility to claim 
damages from other parties who may have contributed to the loss as 
well). From a victim’s and deterrence perspective, one may well 
argue that a joint and several liability rule may be preferable; in that 
case, the victim can simply sue any of the available injurers who are 
all exposed to liability and claim full compensation. 
Another argument advanced in favor of the channeling of liability 
to the tanker owner referred to the fact that the tanker owner could 
more easily obtain insurance coverage than other parties. However, 
that argument was rightly rejected in the literature: each of the other 
parties who influence the risk of an oil pollution incident could easily 
purchase liability insurance coverage as well.297 “Insurance rates 
should reflect the likelihood of a liability-inducing oil discharge and 
should reward safety measures with lower premiums.”298 Also, the 
insurance argument hardly provides any justification for the 
channeling of liability that results in an inefficient exclusion of other 
parties than the tanker owner who could also influence the risk. 
In sum, from an economic perspective, one would prefer a situation 
where all those who contributed in some way to the risk are exposed 
 
295 Id. arts. III(4), V(1). 
296 See TOM VANDEN BORRE, EFFICIËNTE PREVENTIE EN COMPENSATIE VAN 
CATASTROFERISICO’S: HET VOORBEELD VAN SCHADE DOOR KERNONGEVALLEN 
[EFFICIENT PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION OF CATASTROPHIC RISKS: THE EXAMPLE 
OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENT DAMAGE] 698–99 (2001) (Neth.). 
297 Not channeled liability means that other parties like operators and charters may also 
be held liable. These other parties can have insurance coverage. For example, the P&I 
Clubs also provide coverage to charters, see International Group of P and I Associations, 
supra note 107. Professional liability insurance is a possibility for other professionals in 
oil transportation to cover their potential liability. For a list of insurance companies 
providing professional liability, see Directory of Professional Liability Insurance Carriers, 
NSPE, http://www.nspe.org/ProfessionalLiability/Insurance/LiabilityDirInsCarriers/index 
.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
298 Lance D. Wood, An Integrated International and Domestic Approach to Civil 
Liability for Vessel-Source Oil Pollution, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 40 (1976). 
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to liability so that they receive optimal incentives to reduce the 
accident risk.299 
2. Joint and Several Liability 
OPA imposes liability for vessel marine pollution jointly and 
severally on the shipowner, operator, and demise charterer.300 The 
inefficiency of a joint and several liability system is widely discussed 
in economic literature.301 Under joint and several liability, a victim 
can recover full compensation from any of the tortfeasors who have 
jointly contributed to the loss. This is to be distinguished from a 
several-only liability rule, whereby each tortfeasor is only held to 
compensate a proportion of the damage caused by his individual 
action. 
The efficiency of joint and several liability versus several-only 
liability depends, as held especially in various studies by Kornhauser 
and Revesz, upon the relative solvency of the parties involved.302 
 
299 A consequence of holding several parties liable is that all those parties must also 
take insurance coverage. This may lead to increased administrative costs, which was 
precisely the reason why, historically, the drafters of the CLC opted for channeling of 
liability to the tanker owner. See Wang, supra note 60, at 229. However, one should 
ultimately wonder whether these increased administrative costs are substantially higher 
than the losses resulting from not exposing all parties that can influence the accident risk. 
It is not very likely that this will be the case. 
300 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012). This provision does not channel liability to shipowners 
exclusively, hence the other parties who can contribute to the damage, such as an operator 
and charter can also be held liable. 
301 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook et al., Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331 (1980); Marcel Kahan, The Incentive 
Effects of Settlements Under Joint and Several liability, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 389 
(1996); Daniel Klerman, Settling Multidefendant Lawsuits: The Advantage of Conditional 
Setoff Rule, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 445 (1996); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980); A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust 
Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 STAN. L. REV. 447 (1980); Kathryn E. Spier, A 
Note on Joint and Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 559 (1994). 
302 See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Apportioning Damages Among 
Potentially Insolvent Actors, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 617 (1990); Lewis A. Kornhauser & 
Richard L. Revesz, Multidefendant Settlements: The Impact of Joint and Several Liability, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (1994); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard C. Revesz, Multidefendant 
Settlements Under Joint and Several Liability: The Problem of Insolvency, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 517 (1994); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Settlements Under Joint 
and Several Liability, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 427 (1993); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. 
Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831 (1989). 
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Under full solvency of all parties involved, joint and several liability 
has the advantage, so they show, in that it provides optimal incentives 
for prevention. It will lead to a mutual monitoring by all parties 
potentially exposed to the risk.303 Moreover, in case one tortfeasor is 
selected by the victim to compensate the damage, that tortfeasor will 
exercise a right of recourse against those who contributed to the loss 
as well.304 Hence, this provides incentives to all parties involved to 
take prevention. 
The result only changes under a potential insolvency. It relates to 
the general point that insolvency always negatively affects incentives 
of tortfeasors for prevention. Under joint and several liability, 
insolvency leads to an exclusive liability of one party who is chosen 
by the victim.305 That party may, given the insolvency of the other 
actors involved, not have the opportunity to collect from others that 
part of the damage they caused.306 Insolvency thus leads to those 
insolvent actors externalizing harm upon others, and therefore, to 
insufficient incentives for prevention.307 Moreover, the results also 
change in the case of strict liability. In that case, joint and several 
liability may lead to underdeterrence.308 Given that in all oil pollution 
regimes we examined a strict liability rule applies, joint and several 
liability may therefore be problematic. 
The results also change when insurance considerations are taken 
into account. Many have pointed to the fact that joint and several 
liability may increase the exposure of insurance companies and, thus, 
insurance premiums.309 Given this, many lawyers, especially when 
considering insurance aspects, have questioned joint and several 
liability.310 
From the above analysis, the American system, which imposes 
joint and several liability on the tanker owner and the bareboat 
charterer, seems (with some reservation) more in line with the 
 
303 See supra note 302. 
304 See supra note 302. 
305 See supra note 302. 
306 See supra note 302. 
307 See supra note 302. 
308 See supra note 302. 
309 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO 
ST. L.J., 399 (1987); Nancy Manzer, 1986 Tort Refrom Legislation: A Systematic 
Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 628 (1987). 
310 See, e.g., FAURE & HARTLIEF, supra note 41, at 126–27. 
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economic rationale, while the international system, with an exclusive 
channeling of liability to the registered owner, seems less effective. 
C. Amount of Compensation 
The general principle in tort law is restitutio in integrum, meaning 
compensation to the full amount. However, under all the regimes 
discussed in this paper, the international, the U.S., as well as the 
Chinese oil pollution liability system, the tortfeasor is not exposed to 
full liability since his liability is capped to a certain amount.311 
As a common feature, all these liability regimes adopt at least two 
levels of compensation, but each level of compensation is limited. 
Such a limited compensation regime applies not only to natural 
resource damage but also to the pollution damage as a whole. Under 
the three liability regimes, the method to calculate the amount of 
compensation under the first layer largely varies: the international and 
Chinese regimes relate the liability limit solely to the tonnage of the 
vessel,312 while the U.S. regime relates the liability also to the (safety) 
structure of the vessel.313 Such a difference may influence the practice 
that will be further discussed below. 
  
 
311 See Michael Faure et al., Economic Analysis of Financial Caps in Accident Law, 
Paper Presentation at the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the European Association of 
Law and Economics in Ghent, Belgium (Sept. 14–16, 2000) (offering an economic 
analysis of financial caps). 
312 See supra Table 1; supra Part IV.C. 
313 See supra Part III.B.2. 
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Table 5: Comparison of Compensation Amounts Under the Current 
International, U.S. and Chinese Regimes (USD) 
Amount of 
compensation 
International 
regime U.S. OPA China 
First layer of 
compensation 
CLC (2,000 
Resolutions) 
Ships ≤ 5,000 GT: 
6.93 million; 
Ships > 5,000 GT: 
6.93 million + 
969.8/additional 
ton; 
Overall limit: 
137.97 million 
 
Single-hull 
tankers: 
≤ 3,000 GT, the 
higher of 
3,200/GT or 
6.408 million; 
> 3,000 GT, the 
higher of 
3,200/GT or 22 
million. 
Double-hull 
tankers: 
≤ 3,000 GT, the 
higher of 
2,100/GT or 
4.272 million; 
> 3,000 GT, the 
higher of 
2,100/GT or 
17.088 million. 
Other vessels: 
The higher of 
1,000/GT or 
854,400 
CLC vessels: 
= CLC amounts; 
Non-CLC vessels: 
20 ≤ Ships < 21GT, 
42,265.3; 
21 ≤ Ships < 300GT, 
42,265.3 + 
768.46/GT; 
300 ≤ Ships ≤ 500GT, 
256,665.64; 
501 ≤ Ships ≤ 
30,000GT, 256,665.64 
+ 256.67/GT; 
30,001 ≤ Ships ≤ 
70,000GT, amount 
above + 192.12/GT; 
Ships ≥ 70,001 GT, 
above amount + 
127.56/GT. 
 
Second layer of 
compensation 
IOPC Fund (2,000 
Resolutions): 
311.99 million 
OSLTF: 
2.7 billion 
China fund: 
4.77 million 
Third layer of 
compensation 
Supplementary 
Fund: 
1,152.69 million 
  
At the international level, the limited liability resulted in under-
compensation, which can be shown by referring to the historical 
evolution of the international regime. Every time a new incident with 
higher damage occurred, the limits were again increased since the 
then-existing limits apparently did not suffice to provide 
compensation to accident victims.314 
OPA also provides for limited liability, but the inefficiencies in the 
U.S. regime do not seem to be so serious as in the international 
regime. This is because first, the liability limits in OPA are so high 
 
314 See Noah Sachs, Beyond the Liability Wall: Strengthening Tort Remedies in 
International Environmental Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 837 (2008). 
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that it has been challenged only on a few occasions. The data from the 
Coast Guard show that from the enactment of OPA in 1990 to 2009, 
there have been fifty-one oil discharges resulting in removal costs and 
damages that exceed the amended liability limits.315 Second, the 
calculation of liability limits since the increase in 2006 is not only 
based on the tonnage but also related to the structure of the tanker—
that is, the liability limit for a single-hull tanker is higher than that for 
a double-hull tanker of the same size.316 This could thus still provide 
incentives for prevention. Third, the grant of the limitation right is 
under the condition that the parties have complied with certain 
requirements.317 Such a right can easily be lost if the shipowners or 
other responsible parties do not comply with the relevant 
requirements or do not cooperate. Fourth, the non-preemption of state 
laws leaves the option open for the states to provide for unlimited 
liability, and there are indeed states prescribing unlimited liability in 
their state laws.318 All these additional provisions mean that the 
limitation of liability in the U.S. regime is prescribed in an almost 
unlimited manner and with severe restrictions, which might alleviate, 
at least to a certain extent, the inefficiencies of the financial limits. 
As was indicated, in China, neither the TLL nor the EPA have 
limits on liability.319 However, parties can limit their liability under 
the CLC. Moreover, the duty to seek financial coverage is limited to 
the amounts specified in an implementing regulation of 2010 on 
vessel-induced pollution.320 Additional compensation can be provided 
through a national compensation fund to a limit of RMB 30 million 
(4.77 million USD) per accident.321 
D. Financial Security 
The CLC, OPA, and Chinese law all have requirements on 
compulsory liability insurance for oil-pollution damage or other forms 
 
315 U.S. COAST GUARD, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIL POLLUTION ACT (OPA) 
LIABILITY LIMITS: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.uscg.mil/npfc///docs/PDFs/Reports/Liability_Limits_Report_2009.pdf. 
316 See supra Part III.B.2. 
317 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c) (2012). 
318 See supra Part III.B.4. 
319 See supra Part IV.A. 
320 See supra Part IV.C. 
321 See supra Part IV.D. 
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of financial guarantee. This requirement of financial security can be 
understood from an economic perspective. 
It was already mentioned that a strict liability rule could be 
considered efficient only if there is no insolvency risk. Insolvency 
may pose a problem of underdeterrence. Peter Jost has pointed out 
that in the case of insolvency, compulsory insurance might provide an 
optimal outcome.322 By introducing a duty to purchase insurance 
coverage for the amount of the expected loss, better results will be 
obtained than with insolvency—whereby the magnitude of the loss 
exceeds the injurer’s assets.323 In the latter case, the injurer will 
consider the risk as one where he could, at most, lose his own assets 
and will set his standards of care accordingly. When under a duty to 
insure and exposed to full liability, the insurer will obviously have 
incentives to control the behavior of the insured. Through the 
traditional instruments for the control of moral hazard, the insurer can 
make sure that the injurer will take the necessary care to avoid an 
accident with the real magnitude of the loss. Thus, economic literature 
argues that compulsory insurance can provide better results than 
under the judgment-proof problem, provided that the moral hazard 
problem can be adequately cured.324 
This economic argument shows that insolvency may cause 
potentially responsible parties to externalize harm: they may engage 
in activities causing harm that can largely exceed their assets. Without 
financial provisions, these costs would be thrown on society and 
would be externalized instead of internalized. Internalization can be 
reached if the insurer is able to control the behavior of the insured. 
The insurer could set appropriate policy conditions and require an 
adequate (risk-related) premium. This shows that, if the moral hazard 
problem can be cured adequately, insurance leads to an even higher 
 
322 Peter J. Jost, Limited Liability and the Requirement to Purchase Insurance, 16 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 259 (1996). A similar argument has been formulated by Mattias Polborn 
and Goran Skogh. See Mattias K. Polborn, Mandatory Insurance and the Judgement-Proof 
Problem, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 141 (1998); Goran Skogh, Mandatory Insurance: 
Transaction Costs Analysis of Insurance, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: 
CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 279, at 521 (pointing out that compulsory 
insurance may save on transaction cost). 
323 See Howard C. Kunreuther & Paul K. Freeman, Insurability, Environmental Risks 
and the Law, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 302 (Anthony Heyes 
ed., 2001). 
324 This point was made especially by Jost and Skogh. See Jost, supra note 322; Skogh, 
supra note 322. 
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deterrence than a situation without liability insurance and 
insolvency.325 
Therefore, the requirement of compulsory insurance or other 
financial guarantee complies with the economic theory. The three 
systems examined in this respect therefore correspond with the 
economic standpoint. 
E. Compensation Funds 
From the above, it follows that if one fears those on which liability 
for oil-pollution damage is placed—for example, the tanker owner 
might be insolvent in the sense that the amount of the damage he or 
she may cause could be higher than his or her wealth—a duty to seek 
financial coverage through insurance or alternative mechanisms 
should be introduced.326 However, the amount of oil-pollution damage 
may be so large that even traditional insurance mechanisms or 
pooling by operators may not provide sufficient coverage. In order for 
such a fund to function efficiently, the duty to contribute to the fund 
should, in principle, only rest upon those who actually contributed to 
the risk and should be related to the amount of risk to which the 
specific activity contributes.327 In this way, the contributors to the 
fund are given incentives for prevention. Bad risks are punished by 
paying a greater contribution to the fund, and good risks are rewarded 
by paying less contribution. Such a fund structure is not only 
important from an efficiency point of view, by providing optimal 
incentives for prevention, but it also includes a fairness element. 
Examining the financing structure of the IOPC Fund and the 
Chinese Oil Compensation Fund, the oil recipients pay levies and 
their contribution is calculated on the amount of oil received in a 
certain period of time.328 Consequently, the financing structure merely 
incentivizes the oil industry to adapt the activity level (e.g., 
 
325 There are, however, also a few dangers that should be taken into account when a 
duty to insure is introduced. One of them is that the moral hazard problem should be 
cured; another is that there may not be concentration on insurance markets. For these 
potential dangers of compulsory insurance, see Faure & Grimeaud, supra note 42, at 185–
89. 
326 See Michael G. Faure, Alternative Compensation Mechanisms as Remedies for 
Uninsurability of Liability, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 455 (2004). 
327 See Michael G. Faure, Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Law 
and Economics Perspective, 29 L. & POL’Y 339 (2007). 
328 See supra Parts II.C.2, IV.D. 
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transporting less oil) but not to an efficient level of care. Moreover, 
the IOPC Fund, in the normal case, only intervenes for the amount 
that is not covered by the limited liability of the tanker owner,329 
which is a small part of the total costs of an oil-pollution incident. It 
was decided during the conference that only five percent of large-
scale oil casualties could not be dealt with under the existing rules.330 
Effectively, this means that the oil interests would only intervene for a 
relatively small part of oil pollution incidents, albeit the incidents 
where the IOPC Fund intervenes are usually catastrophic. 
The major financing source of the OSLTF is an environmental tax 
based on the amount of oil transported.331 In this respect, the structure 
of the OSLTF is similar to that of the IOPC Fund at the international 
level. Therefore, a similar critique holds that such a financing 
structure only incentivizes the shipowner and other responsible parties 
to reduce the activity level but does not incentivize caretaking. For 
example, oil importers are not rewarded with a lower contribution for 
investments in prevention (e.g., choosing safer ships). 
F. Compensation of Natural Resource Damage 
It is interesting to note the different trends at international and U.S. 
levels with respect to environmental damage. While the United States 
is actively developing methods and procedures for restoring 
ecosystems, the international community is still debating whether 
claims for injury to the environment should be admissible. OPA 
allows recovery for the “loss of use” of natural resources and for 
values calculated by computer modeling, both of which have been 
rejected under the international regime.332 Based on Fund Resolution 
No. 3, the practice under international conventions is to reject claims 
for damage to the environment if they are based upon “theoretical 
models.”333 
 
329 1992 Fund Convention, supra note 267, art. IV(1)(a)–(c). An exception would be 
the case where the tanker owner is insolvent. In this case, the Fund would, de facto, act as 
a guarantor towards the victim. Id. art. IV(1)(b). 
330 Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Official Records of the International Legal Conference on 
Marine Pollution Damage, at 685–86, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF/C.2/SR12, 685–86 (1969). 
331 See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
332 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1)(B) (2012); 15 CFR § 990.27 (b)(1)(iii) (2013). 
333 Int’l Oil Pollution Compensation Fund [IOPC Fund], Resolution, Annex I, 
FUND/A/ES.1/13 (Oct. 17, 1980), available at http://documentservices.iopcfunds.org 
/decisions-database/decision/decision/incident-0-decision-2212/ (follow “71/FUND 
/A/ES.1/13–para 11(a) and Annex I” hyperlink). 
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OPA provides that parties are liable to the relevant authorities for 
the diminution in value of natural resources pending restoration and 
not merely for the cost of restoration.334 By contrast, the CLC 
expressly limits recovery for general environmental damage to any 
reasonable measures of restoration actually taken or to be taken.335 
Putting a value on the environment has caused difficulties in the 
past, and this is one of the reasons why the CLC of 1992 sought to 
avoid the issue. The Antonio Gramsci and Patmos cases, where 
attempts were made to assess compensation using an abstract 
quantification of damage calculated by theoretical models, have cast 
long shadows.336 
The environmental damage quantification in the international 
regime is in contrast with the OPA provision where abstract 
quantification of nonmarket environmental damage is allowed in 
accordance with prescribed assessment standards.337 The current “lack 
of clear damage-assessment standards and compensable-value 
characteristics within the international regime has presented a 
significant obstacle to the uniform application of environmental 
compensation rules.”338 
The way in which environmental damage is currently assessed and 
compensated within the international conventions has been subject to 
criticism. The formal requirement of the CLC is that the environment 
has to be damaged and that the claimant must have sustained an 
economic loss that can be quantified in economic terms.339 This 
constitutes a problem if a coastal area that suffers a spill is a protected 
area or a natural reserve. If this area is not open to the public—who 
pay an entrance fee—there would be no income loss, and hence, no 
economic loss that could be compensated. This strong focus on the 
economic value of environmental damage neglects the intrinsic value 
 
334 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1)(B). 
335 Gavin Little & Jenny Hamilton, Compensation for Catastrophic Oil Spills: A 
Transatlantic Comparison, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 391, 401 (1997). 
336 Id.; Wilkinson, supra note 81, at 82–88. 
337 15 CFR § 990.27 (b)(1). 
338 Mason, supra note 82, at 4 (citing Little & Hamilton, supra note 335, at 405). 
339 CLC of 1992, supra note 55, art. I(6). 
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of the environment and is a problematic aspect of compensation in the 
international regime.340 
In addition, the international regime limits compensation to the 
reasonable costs of restoration.341 As a result, unquantifiable or 
unquantified claims are rejected.342 However, “difficulties may arise   
. . . in respect . . . to what extent [restoration] of the environment is 
‘reasonable’ and in dealing with major spills that produce irreparable 
environmental damage.”343 By limiting compensation “to the costs of 
reasonable measures of [restoration, the CLC of 1992] may not be 
sufficiently broad to allow compensation where marine oil pollution 
incidents cause[] economically irreparable environmental damage or 
damage of a kind which is extensively mitigated by natural 
regeneration.”344 In response, Wilkinson has argued in favor of an 
application of the U.S. approach to the international regime.345 The 
result would be that the current “diminution of value test” is 
rejected.346 Such a test is simply inappropriate for environmental 
damage that often is not reflected in market values.347 
Some even believed that, contrary to the Fund Secretariat’s 
position, claims for environmental damage should be eligible when 
based on a quantification of the environmental damage calculated in 
accordance with theoretical environmental models.348 By definition, it 
is not the economic loss that is at issue but the environmental damage, 
the restoration of nature, and the compensation of a theoretical 
economic loss. Relevant criteria for the restoration of a biological 
community would be the condition of the natural resources and the 
services that would have existed had the environmental damage not 
occurred, estimated on the basis of the best information available, 
including historical data, reference data, control data, or data on 
incremental changes.349 
 
340 See Bernard Vanheule, Oil Pollution: The International Liability and Compensation 
Regime, 38 EUR. TRANSPORT L. 547 (2003). The CLC clearly states that environmental 
damage is compensable but only for reasonable restoration costs. See supra Part II.B.3. 
341 CLC of 1992, supra note 55, art. I(6)(a). 
342 See supra Part II.B.3. 
343 Wilkinson, supra note 81, at 87–88. 
344 Id. at 89. 
345 Id. 
346 Id. 
347 Id. 
348 Id. at 83. 
349 See id. at 88. 
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In its post-Erika proposals, the European Commission, echoing 
French and Italian concerns, called for amendments to the CLC of 
1992 to enable restorative compensation for environmental damage in 
a manner consistent with wider Commission proposals on civil 
liability for environmental damage.350 However, while a working 
group identified that there was latitude for more innovative recovery 
measures, it did not accept proposals to allow environmental 
compensation beyond economic losses.351 Conversely, delegations 
from Australia, Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom proposed a 
more modest recommendation to liberalize the criteria for 
admissibility of restoration costs to include recovery efforts centered 
on the damage areas—short of substitute habitat enhancement or 
creation.352 This proposal was not accepted either.353 
From the comparative analysis of the different approaches adopted 
under the CLC and OPA concerning pollution damage, it seems that 
compensable pollution damages under OPA are broader than those 
under the CLC, at least as far as pure economic losses and 
environmental damage are concerned. 
Congress intended OPA to address the consequences of 
discharging, or threatening to discharge, all amounts of any type of oil 
into navigable waters of the United States.354 The CLC and Fund 
Convention apply only to ships carrying persistent oils as bulk 
cargo.355 Thus, the conventions exclude all liability for spills of 
refined products such as gasoline, kerosene, and light diesel oils that 
are covered by OPA. OPA is expansive in the domestic context. The 
CLC definition of pollution damage will not encourage claims for 
damage to the environment beyond reasonable measures of 
 
350 See Henrik Ringbom, The Erika Accident and Its Effects on EU Maritime 
Regulation, in CURRENT MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 265 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore 
eds., 2001). 
351 Int’l Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, Record of Decisions of the Sixth Session of 
the Assembly, at 7–9, 92FUND/A.6/28 (Oct. 19, 2001), available at documentservices.iopc 
funds.org/meeting-documents/download/docs/2049/lang/en/. 
352 See id. at 8. 
353 Id. at 9; INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 
34 (2001). 
354 Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012). 
355 CLC of 1992, supra note 55, art. I(1); 1992 Fund Convention, supra note 267, art. 
I(2). 
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restoration and for loss of profits, and the loss of use, per se, is 
specifically excluded.356 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper compared the compensation for natural resource 
damage caused by marine oil pollution in the international regime, the 
United States, and China. Europe, which is the main player in the 
international regime, and the United States have both been confronted 
with cases of major oil spills causing considerable natural resource 
damage. As a result of those incidents, the international regime has 
experienced many developments and refinements. Conversely, the 
system in China is still in full development; although, as was shown, 
the compensation for marine pollution damage is rather elaborate and 
refined when compared to the compensation for other types of 
environmental damage in China. The reason may be that China 
incorporated the CLC, which forced it to adopt a strict liability rule 
and mandatory financial security to guarantee the tanker owner’s 
liability. China did not, however and for obvious reasons, join the 
International Fund Convention. China is a net importer of oil and, 
being the second largest importer of crude oil in the world,357 it would 
have automatically become the largest contributor to the IOPC 
Fund.358 Presently, China has suffered less marine-pollution incidents 
than other countries that are members to the Fund Convention. If 
China were to join the International Fund Convention, there is a great 
likelihood that China would be a net contributor to the IOPC Fund; 
that is, contributing more through taxes on the oil received in China 
than it would benefit from compensation via the Fund. 
Understandably, China instead created its own domestic fund that 
clearly mimics the International Fund Convention. This shows that, 
notwithstanding their inherent limits, the international conventions 
constitute an important example for countries with developing 
economies, like China, even if those countries do not necessarily join 
the conventions. 
 
356 See Molly Holt & Grayson Reed Cecil, Natural Resource Damages for Oil Spills: 
The International Context, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 28 (1995) (comparing the 
position under OPA). 
357 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, 2012 KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS, at 11 (2012). 
China is the second largest crude oil net importer, next to the United States. Id. 
358 Given that the United States is not party to the International Fund Convention. 
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The United States was involved in the drafting process of the 
international conventions, but as a consequence of the Exxon Valdez 
incident in 1989, it chose a rapid introduction of its own oil pollution 
act rather than joining the international conventions, which were 
deemed contrary to American interests. 
It has to be said that when the compensation regime for natural 
resource damage caused by marine pollution in the United States is 
compared to the regime in the international conventions, it is not 
difficult to argue that OPA provides better protection to pollution 
victims and more adequate remedies for natural resource damage, and 
therefore, a better internalization of the externalities caused by marine 
pollution. Unlike the international regime, OPA has no channeling of 
liability to the tanker owner but, instead, a joint and several liability 
regime that exposes others who contributed to the risk of marine 
pollution to liability. Moreover, the financial cap on the tank owner’s 
liability is set at a much higher amount in OPA than in the 
international regime, and the operators can lose their right to limit 
liability with relative ease (e.g., when the damage was caused by 
gross negligence). Since OPA does not preempt state law, operators 
can be subject to unlimited liability when provided for in state law, as 
is often the case (e.g., in Alaska, California, North Carolina, and 
Rhode Island). 
The total amount available for compensating natural resource 
damage under OPA is also substantially higher than under the 
international regime. After the latest increases, compensation in the 
United States (taking into account compensation via the OSLTF) 
could amount to $2.7 billion, whereas under the international regime, 
this would be limited to a total amount of approximately $1.5 billion. 
Most importantly, the definition of environmental damage, and 
therefore of the type of damage that can be compensated, is 
substantially broader under U.S. law than in the international regime. 
OPA seems to have taken a more ecocentric approach by generously 
compensating restoration costs and the costs of replacing the damaged 
natural resources (or the equivalent thereof), as well as the diminution 
in value of those natural resources needing restoration (the so-called 
interim losses). In the international regime, to the contrary, a more 
anthropocentric, even economic approach is followed by limiting 
compensation to those aspects of the environment that have an 
economic value, although this approach is criticized in legal doctrine. 
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The international regime can undoubtedly learn from OPA in the 
sense that it should consider moving to a strict, non-channeled 
liability, thus exposing liability to others who have also contributed to 
the risk of marine pollution. As in OPA, it should be easier to break 
the financial limits, and both the United States as well as the 
international regime could consider possibilities to make the 
contributions to the funds more risk-related in order to have those 
contributions also incentivize operators towards using safer ships and 
implementing preventive technologies. 
China can learn from the experiences in the United States and in 
the international regime. The fact that the U.S. regime seems better 
able to provide adequate compensation—thanks to accurate damage 
assessment methods—may be an important lesson for China. Chinese 
practitioners complain of their legal doctrines lacking assessment 
standards. This limitation makes the judiciary’s task in assessing 
natural resource damages difficult. Given the increasing oil imports in 
China and the fact that most of these imports are seaborne, it must be 
feared that China may be confronted with oil spills that threaten 
natural resources. With increasing environmental awareness in China, 
demands for adequate damage assessment and restoration measures 
will undoubtedly also increase. In that respect, there is an opportunity 
for mutual learning by comparing the situation in China with 
experiences in the United States and the international conventions. It 
is to this process of mutual learning that this Article hopes to 
contribute. 
 
